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Abstract
Essays on the Effectiveness and Competitiveness of State Government
Expenditures
J. Sebastian Leguizamon
This dissertation addresses issues related to the effectiveness and consequences of state
and local spending in the United States. Chapter two examines how merit-based aid tuition
assistance contributes to the retention of graduates in a state. An analysis of restricted-
use administrative data for West Virginia graduates suggests that in-state college graduates
that received merit-based aid to attend college are no more likely to work in the state after
graduation, compared to those who did not received the assistance. These graduates are
between 1.9 and 5.2 percentage points less likely to remain in the state, decreasing the overall
effect of merit-based assistance on the retention of human capital. In chapter three I calculate
the implicit marginal tax rates for individuals that participate in multiple welfare programs
and use them to examine the extent to which it may affect labor force participation of welfare
recipients after the reform of 1996. The analysis supports the hypothesis that high implicit
marginal tax rates discourages workers from looking for work and becoming self-sufficient.
On average, a standard-deviation increase in these rates lowers the work participation rates
of TANF recipients by 0.208 standard deviations, or 8.5 percent. Chapter four looks at the
consequences of state welfare spending across the border. In it, I use data from 1987 to 2007
and find that the interaction of state governments does depend on the political environment
of each state. Single party majority governments do not react to neighboring states’ welfare
spending while divided governments do. Also, fiscal policy reactions among states appear
to depend on what political party holds the majority. Finally, the analysis suggests that
the welfare reform of 1996 did change the way in which these governments reacted to one
another, which can be mainly attributed to the change from a matching-grant to a block-
grant system. An initial examination of the data suggests that the surge in Republican
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Throughout history economists have emphasized the importance of efficiency. Resources are
scarce and economists have spent years studying the many ways in which economic agents
allocate the resources available to them. Microeconomic theory has shown that competitive
markets tend to allocate resources more efficiently, yet theory has justified government inter-
ventions for instances in which market outcomes fail to provide full economic efficiency. In
such cases, policy interventions are thought of as the tool that can potentially solve market
imperfections and improve the social well-being of individuals.
However, not all public policies achieve efficiency either. Many government policies result
in outcomes that are far less efficient than those provided by imperfect but unregulated
markets. Often, these policies, both at the federal and state and local levels, are justified
on equity basis rather than efficiency. Indeed, an increase in equity is a goal held by many
policy makers and government intervention. Based on this criterion, it is widely accepted
and very popular. However, this popularity tends to interfere with our understanding what
equity and fairness really mean.
Many economists agree that education is one of the key elements in the creation of human
capital and therefore the development of a region. Hence, it is in the best interest of a region
to increase the levels of education of its population. However, not everyone can afford sending
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his/her children to college. Capable children in poor families may be unable to obtain a
higher education due to the family’s financial constraints, and consequently remain poor.
This phenomenon then can perpetuate for many generations, contributing to the persistence
of poverty and falling into what has been known as the ‘poverty trap’ (Bowles, Durlauf and
Hoff, 2006; Sachs, 2006; Aariadis and Stachurski, 2004; Barham, Boadway, Marchand and
Pestieau, 1995).
At first sight, this may seem not only unfortunate but also unfair, and thus the gov-
ernment should reallocate resources from the rich to the poor so that these people can be
lifted out of poverty. However, if analyzed from a purely equitable perspective, can we say
that such policy is one-hundred percent fair? Is it fair to families without children to have
to pay taxes so that other children can be educated? The answers to this type of question
are clearly bound to different interpretations, making equity a very difficult criterion to use
when analyzing the role of public policy. This does not mean that equity and fairness are
not important topics in the study of public policy and public economics; however, they are
rather ambiguous and many economists try instead to focus on efficiency.
Efficient economic systems are those in which everyone is as well off as possible (Brown-
ing and Browning, 1994). An economy is operating efficiently if, and only if, the reallocation
of resources cannot make any person better off without harming somebody else. If there is
room to improve the well-being of an individual without hurting the well-being of anybody
else, the economy (or market) is such in which resources are not being allocated efficiently.
In that case, a government economic policy that improves the level of efficiency may be jus-
tified. This, however, needs to be undertaken with caution. While most people care about
raising the well being of all individuals, some societies make different value judgements on
whose well-being is most important. Some groups, for instance, do not have a problem with
increasing the well-being of poor children at the expense of criminals’ well-being. Incorpo-
rating these preferences can prove problematic when defining efficiency due to the lack of
perfect measures of social welfare. As a result, although efficiency of public policy is an im-
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portant tool for evaluation, it presents some complexities as the private interests of certain
groups vary across societies (Browning and Browning, 1994).
If the purpose of government intervention is to correct inefficient markets, improve upon
efficiency, and reach maximum levels of social welfare, it is especially difficult to assess
public policy outcomes when there is no properly defined measure or amount of optimal
welfare. Although not a perfect method, economists often focus on the use of cost-benefit
analysis to evaluate the efficiency of expenditure programs. This method is widely used
in both the private and public sectors. Based on principles of welfare economics, cost-
benefit analysis attempts to provide information on the normative issue of whether certain
investments should be undertaken. This is not an easy task as it is sometimes very difficult
to identify all benefits and all costs, as well as who benefits and who bears the cost. This is,
of course, not to mention the difficulties in determining the future value of certain benefits,
and compare them with the present costs (Cullis and Jones, 1998; Browning and Browning,
1994).
According to Browning and Browning (1994), expenditure analysis (the main element of
this dissertation) focuses on two basic categories: (1) allocative effects and (2) distributive
effects. Allocative effects deal with the way in which “expenditure program[s] affect the
pattern of goods and services produced,” and distributive effects examine the question of
who is the one bearing the costs and who is the beneficiary. Cost-benefit analysis tries to
deal with efficiency, and thus the first category. The second category is more closely related
to the issue of equity mentioned above. In this context, this dissertation is concerned with
the former, leaving the latter for future analysis.
Yet, while a comprehensive analysis of government expenditure programs includes a
complete cost-benefit analysis, this dissertation focuses on the first step toward evaluating
the economic effects of public policy programs. Specifically, I primarily investigate the
efficacy of particular state and local government spending toward achieving the intended
outcomes. Before even undertaking a cost-benefit analysis, I take a step back and examine
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whether certain public expenditure programs are justifiable on the ground of accomplishing
their initial goals. In addition, I analyze the political effects of these programs. By looking at
government expenditures in different jurisdictions, I examine the political process to which
these governmental programs are subject, and how the type of political environment affects
the level and nature of expenditures associated with them.
In chapter two and chapter three I examine state and local expenditures on higher edu-
cation and public welfare assistance, focusing on the issue of how effective these are toward
achieving the intended outcomes. In chapter 2 I particularly examine the effect of merit-
based scholarships on the probability of retaining college graduates in their home state after
graduation. This chapter uses a unique data set containing information on wages from em-
ployment for graduates from West Virginia public colleges and universities in 2008. While
other research has focused on the effects of such aid on outcomes such as in-state enrollment,
private versus public enrollment, and college enrollment by income, in this chapter I exam-
ine the effect of the West Virginia merit-based aid (i.e. the ‘PROMISE’ scholarship) on the
participation of graduates in the state’s workforce. As in many other states, this merit-based
assistance was implemented in West Virginia with the intent of keeping the best and the
brightest in the state for, and hopefully after, college.
Some merit-based scholarship programs have been justified as investments that can raise
the level of education in the state’s labor force, which will eventually contribute to its
economic growth. Using data on employment earnings, the results of the analysis show
that after controlling for aptitude, residency status, and other demographics, ‘PROMISE’
scholarship recipients are no more likely to work in West Virginia after graduation. This is
partly explained by the fact that high aptitude students (measured by ACT scores) are more
likely to leave the state and seek employment somewhere else. Consequently, even though
the program may increase the stock of graduates through in-state enrollment, it has no effect
on retaining graduates after college, and thus no significant impact on the creation of better
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state human capital.1
In chapter 3 I examine the effect of implicit taxation on the decisions of welfare recipients
to participate in the labor force. In particular, I study the short-run variation of work
participation decisions of working Americans living in poverty across the U.S. states. Families
with income below the federal poverty line often qualify for several assistance programs. The
eligibility criteria varies by state and by the level of income. Studies have found that, given
the nature of the benefit reduction scheme for each program, families that participated in
more than one program prior to the U.S. Welfare Reform of 1996 usually faced very high
implicit tax rates. Under federal control, a typical welfare recipient’s additional disposable
income gained from additional hours worked could have been as little as 20 or even 10 percent
of the additional earnings. Facing such disincentives, families would reasonably choose to
remain in welfare and out of the labor force. The results of this chapter suggest that these
disincentives have not disappeared from the welfare recipients’ lives.
The reform granted states the authority to make their own decisions regarding the benefit
structure of their own welfare programs. Although some states do appear to have systems
in which welfare recipients find it more encouraging to find work, there are some states in
which the phasing out of welfare benefits continue to translate into high implicit taxation.
Results suggest that aggregated implicit marginal tax rates resulting from these programs
have influenced the overall work participation of welfare recipients across U.S. states. The
cross-sectional analysis reveals that implicit marginal tax rates emerging from increasing
working hours at the state’s minimum wage, decreases the work participation of welfare
family recipients. In other words, the results not only suggest that welfare recipients en-
counter huge implicit marginal tax rates in some states, but they also point at a negative
correlation between these rates and the work participation rates of welfare recipients.
In the fourth chapter I use spatial maximum likelihood estimation adapted to a panel
data set and find that the degree of spatial dependency among state governments varies
1This chapter is primarily based on a co-authored paper with George W. Hammond.
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according to the political structure of each government. Previous work has found that state
governments “compete” or interact through changes in spending levels. States’ spending
policies appear to be influenced by the spending policies of their neighboring states (Baicker,
2005b; Case, Rosen and Hines Jr., 1993). This occurs as state governments react to their
neighboring states based on two assumptions. First, policy makers believe that voters would
relocate according to the provision of public goods. A neighboring state offering high welfare
benefits will be more attractive to families that depend on welfare, inducing them to leave
their current state. This outflow of families translates into a loss of votes for the current
policy maker during the next election (Tiebout, 1956). On the other hand, even if voters
do not migrate, policy makers may just be simply judged based on what voters observe in
other states. Incumbents that do not keep up with their neighboring state’s policies may
lose potential votes as voters start feeling misrepresented (Besley and Case, 1995).
In 1996, the United States passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) which, among other things, gave states freedom to regulate
public welfare spending individually under a new set of federal guidelines. The increased
state autonomy in setting welfare expenditure levels could certainly result in states exhibiting
a greater degree of spatial dependence. However, spending policy outcomes are subject to
political processes and the consensus of policymakers. Consequently, the political structure
of each state may influence the type and strength of spatial dependence among states.
In this chapter I use expenditure data for the pre-and-post-welfare reform period (1987-
2006) and find that the degree of spatial interrelatedness depends on whether the government
is politically unified or politically divided. Here, states in which one single party holds a
majority of each of the two houses of the legislature and the governorship office are considered
to be unified. When a party controls only two of the three bodies of government (upper
chamber, lower chamber, and Governorship), that state is considered to have a divided
government. Using a two-regime model developed by Elhorst and Fréret (2009), I find that
politically unified governments do not tend to compete with neighboring states, while divided
6
governments do. I also find evidence that this is partly due to the political party controlling
office majority and the type of expenditure used to determine the competition. However,
the results show that the effect of the political structure is different for the pre and the post
reform periods.
In an attempt to isolate the sources of government competition, I use data for public wel-
fare benefits only. As part of the reform, states were given more flexibility and independence
in terms of managing these programs, which reduces the degree of dependency on federal
regulations. Looking at the typical welfare recipient, we can infer that Democrats may be
more susceptible to issues that may affect this type of voter. These results support the
idea of government interaction through political yardstick competition and welfare migra-
tion among states. Finally, I find that migration patterns fail to consistently explain any of
the spatial dependence among states under different political structures, casting some doubt
on the hypothesis that policy makers’ decisions are influenced by the migration of welfare
recipients only. This does not mean, however, that potential migration can be discarded
entirely as the motivation of politicians to respond to neighboring policies.
Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation. In this chapter I summarize and discuss the major
findings of each chapter and review the importance of each finding as it pertains to public
policy. Finally, future research ideas are discussed.
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Chapter 2
The Effect Of Merit-Based Tuition
Assistance On State Human Capital
Retention
1 Introduction
Federal and state governments place an enormous emphasis on the importance of providing
higher education to their citizens as means to improve the quality of the labor force, increase
productivity, and boost economic growth. Recently, several states have begun to invest in
merit-based aid programs. While not being the very first, Georgia began the trend in 1993
with the Helping Outstanding Pupils Educationally (HOPE) scholarship. There are now
16 states with some form of merit-based aid program underway.1 Although the nature of
each state’s merit-aid program varies considerably, they all aim to provide in-state tuition
assistance to the best local students. These programs, however, have not accomplished the
original financial aid goals proposed in the Higher Education Act of 1965, which intended to
increase access to higher education for low-income students (Dynarski, 2002; Heller, 2002;
1They are: Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missis-
sippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and West Virginia.
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DeFrank-Cole, Noland and Green, 2007). In fact, it has been found that merit-based aid
has primarily affected the college location decisions of students of middle and high income
families, who would attend college even in the absence of the scholarship, but has little effect
on college enrollment of low-income students (Dynarski, 2000, 2002). Based on these results,
Cornwell and Mustard (2007) investigate the extent to which merit-based disbursements
simply represent rent payments to those high-income families that would have sent their
children to college, regardless of the award. They find that, for the case of Georgia, car
registrations increased in the counties above the 75th percentile in per-capita income the
year in which income caps were removed from the scholarship requirements, suggesting that
the award may have freed up some education funds to be spent on other assets.
In 2001, West Virginia implemented the PROMISE (Providing Real Opportunities for
Maximizing In-State Student Excellence) scholarship program with the idea of promoting
college education among West Virginia residents. In addition to the common objectives of
merit-aid policies identified by Heller (2002), political leaders believed that by keeping more
students in West Virginia for college would increase the probability that they would stay in
the state to work after graduation (DeFrank-Cole, Noland and Green, 2007).2
Previous research on the labor market impacts of college attendance suggests that it
has a small positive impact on the graduates’ decision to work in that state after graduation
(Groen, 2004). The author takes this as evidence that merit-based aid should not be adopted
because of labor market impacts alone. Bound, Groen, Kezdi and Turner (2004) find that
the production of college graduates in a given state has a modest positive impact on the
share of college graduates living in that state. This is taken as evidence that states have
a limited ability to influence human capital accumulation through the financing of higher
education (which would include the impact of merit-aid scholarships). In addition, Dynarski
(2008) presents evidence that merit-based scholarships may increase the college completion
rates of state residents, using secondary data for Arkansas and Georgia. In contrast to
2Common objectives included: promote college access; keep the best and brightest students in their home
state for college; and reward students who work hard (See also DeFrank-Cole, Noland and Green (2007).
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previous research, Dynarski (2008) argues that merit-aid scholarships in these states are
socially efficient at rates of return to higher education as low as 5%.
This chapter contributes to the merit-based aid literature by exploiting a new data set to
estimate the impact of such program on employment in a state which has not been the subject
of previous analysis. Using restricted-use matched individual-level data on graduates from
public higher education institutions in West Virginia and employment in the state, I estimate
the likelihood of PROMISE graduates to work in the state, after controlling for other factors
such as academic achievement, gender, residency, race, age, enrollment, experience, degree,
and area of concentration. This is no easy task given the potential for selection bias due to
the academic and marketable characteristics of high-achieving PROMISE recipients. To my
knowledge, this is the first research to use direct individual-level observations on the work
experience of graduates receiving merit-aid.
After attempting to reduce the selection bias as much as possible and given students’
decision to attend college in the state, I find that PROMISE graduates are between 1.9 and
5.2 percentage points less likely than graduates that did not receive the scholarship to work
at establishments in West Virginia. These results suggest that states which are considering
adopting merit-based scholarship programs should be wary of unqualified claims that keeping
students in a state for college means that they will be more likely to work in the state after
graduation.
This chapter is divided into 6 subsections. The following section provides a brief look
on the previous literature on the effects of merit-based aid on college decisions and human
capital retention. Section 3 discusses the PROMISE scholarship program in detail. Section
4 discusses the data and the empirical methodology used in the analysis. Section 5 provides
the results of the analysis, and section 6 concludes the chapter.
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2 Literature Review
Much of the research on the impact of merit-based aid has focused on its ability to influence
the accessibility of college attainment and the possible distortionary incentives generated
by such a scholarship. For instance, both Dynarski (2000) and Cornwell, Mustard and
Sridhar (2006) found that Georgia’s HOPE scholarship (a merit-based scholarship) increased
enrollment at state higher-education institutions and Cornwell, Mustard and Sridhar (2006)
found that four-year institutions accounted for most of the increase. They also found that
only a small part of the increase is driven by an increase of recent-graduate freshmen entering
college, which seems surprising since they make up the vast majority of merit-based aid
recipients. Further, Cornwell, Lee and Mustard (2005) found that the HOPE scholarship,
through its grade-based retention rules, decreased full-load enrollment of freshmen, affected
course-taking choices, and increased summer school credits. Along the same lines, Scott-
Clayton (2008) found that completion rates of 4-year degrees are positively affected by course
load requirements mandated for the renewal of the West Virginia PROMISE scholarship.
Similarly, Pallais (2009) found that even though the merit-aid scholarship in Tennessee did
not induce students to stay in the state for college, it did create significant increases in
academic achievement, measured by ACT scores.
A separate strand of the research on merit-based aid has focused on the influence it
may have on local human capital accumulation. The role of human capital in local economic
development has attracted a great deal of attention from researchers in recent years. In part,
this attention is derived from a desire to understand the relative importance of basic growth
determinants at the local level, including human capital, public infrastructure investment,
and private capital investment. One result of this strand of research was evidence suggesting
that human capital accumulation plays a large role in generating long-run local income
growth (see for example Hammond and Thompson (2008), Higgins, Levy and Young (2006),
Shapiro (2006), Moretti (2004), and Glaeser, Scheinkman and Shleifer (1995)).
The importance of human capital in long-run growth has stimulated the interest of pol-
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icymakers looking to improve local and regional economic performance. One avenue that
has been proposed to increase local human capital accumulation has been the provision of
merit-based aid to residents wishing to pursue higher education. Indeed, the legislation
authorizing the PROMISE scholarship in West Virginia specifically cites (along with other
issues) the fact that West Virginia ranks low among states in the share of the population
with a Bachelor’s degree or better.
Implicit in the arguments for the use of merit-based aid to increase human capital accu-
mulation is the idea that residents are more likely to remain in the state after graduation if
they attend college in the state. However, there is evidence that this link is not especially
strong. Groen (2004) uses individual-level data from two separate longitudinal samples of
students that attended college in the 1970s, which also tracks the students’ state of residence
10-15 years after college. He finds a modest link between college attendance in a state and
remaining in that state to work after graduation. Indeed, the results suggest that the impact
of attending college in-state raises the probability of remaining in state by about 9 or 10
percentage points. Groen (2004) argues that labor market impacts alone are unlikely to
justify the adoption of merit-based scholarships.
Bound, Groen, Kezdi and Turner (2004) use state data on Bachelor’s and Medical Doctor
degree production and Census data on the stock of degree holders residing in each state to
measure the relationship between state degree production and state human capital accu-
mulation. They find that the supply of college graduates in a state is modestly positively
correlated with the stock of college graduates, with a positive and significant elasticity of 0.3
in the long run for Bachelor’s degree holders. They find a much smaller positive correlation
for medical degree recipients. Bound, Groen, Kezdi and Turner (2004) suggest that states
can only modestly influence local human capital accumulation through policies designed to
affect higher-education financing.
In addition, Dynarski (2008) presents evidence that merit-based scholarships increase
college completion rates, using Census 2000 data for Arkansas and Georgia. For these two
12
states, Dynarski (2008) finds evidence suggesting that the merit-aid scholarships in these two
states increased the share of college graduates by 3 percentage points. Using cost-benefit
analysis, Dynarski (2008) argues that the merit-aid scholarships in these states are socially
efficient (at rates of return to higher education as low as 5%).
It is important to note that none of the research to date examines the individual work
experience of merit-aid recipients. Groen (2004) examines individual-level data, but does
not have information on merit-based scholarships. Bound et. al. (2004) use secondary data,
which again provides no direct information on merit-based scholarship programs. Dynarski
(2008) analyzes secondary data for two states which adopted merit-based scholarships, but
even this study lacks direct information on the work experience of graduates receiving merit
aid. This chapter examines a novel data set, which contains information on the work expe-
rience of recent graduates, including those receiving merit-based aid.
3 PROMISE Scholarship Program
In 1999, based on Georgia’s HOPE (Help Outstanding Students Educationally) scholarship,
the West Virginia legislature authorized the PROMISE scholarship program. Funding, how-
ever, did not become available until 2001, when it was determined that revenues to fund
the program would come from taxation and regulation of the West Virginia video lottery
machines. West Virginia created the program with the objectives of improving the state’s
workforce, promoting college access, keeping the “best and brightest” students in their home
state for college, and rewarding students who work hard while encouraging younger students
to achieve academic excellence during their high-school years (DeFrank-Cole, Noland and
Green, 2007).
According to the legislation’s requirements, students must earn a minimum 3.0 GPA
in the overall coursework, and a minimum score of 21 in the composite ACT in order to
be eligible to receive the scholarship. However, more students than expected qualified for
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the scholarship and initial cost estimates turned out to underestimate true program costs.
Indeed, initial estimates suggested that funding for the first four classes of PROMISE scholars
would be $27 million; however, actual funding requirements turned out to be about $40
million. In 2007 the state decided to raise the minimum ACT composite score to 22 with a
minimum sub-score of 22 for each of the subject areas. Alternatively, students may obtain
a combined SAT score of 1,020 with a minimum score of 420 in critical reading and 480 in
mathematics.3
In contrast to most state merit-aid programs, PROMISE grantees are provided with a
scholarship that covers full tuition in any of the state institutions, or an equivalent amount
for in-state private institutions. In order to keep the scholarship, college students must earn
a 2.75 grade point average on a 4.0 scale the first year and a 3.0 cumulative grade point
average during all following years. Additionally, students must successfully complete 30
credit-hours per year (DeFrank-Cole, Noland and Green, 2007).
A common argument used to support merit-aid programs is the claim that keeping more
students in the state for college will increase their likelihood of staying in the state for
work. Part of the motivation of the PROMISE scholarship in West Virginia is thus founded
on human capital theory, which states that investment in education and training enhances
human capital, resulting in economic growth with greater returns within the labor market
(Becker, 1964; Shultz, 1963). Legislators believed that West Virginia needed an educated
workforce in order to attract and retain the high wage, high skill jobs (DeFrank-Cole, Noland
and Green, 2007). In other words, legislators assumed that educating the West Virginia
residents would increase the state’s workforce competitiveness, raise wages in the state, and
incentivize more new graduates to seek full-time employment in the state.
Moreover, as DeFrank-Cole, Noland and Green (2007) posit, West Virginia “was hypoth-
esizing that an investment in college tuition for its young people would produce an economic
return from its citizens who later worked and paid taxes in the state.” Thus, such investment
3For a detailed description of the eligibility requirements see www.wvhepcnew.wvnet.edu
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would not only generate private returns, but also social returns where everyone in the state
would benefit.4
As mentioned before, in this chapter I use a unique data set for graduates from West Vir-
ginia public higher education institutions in order to determine whether or not the PROMISE
scholarship has had an impact on the decisions of recent public higher education graduates to
work at establishments in West Virginia. This information is critical to policymakers (both in
West Virginia and around the country) who are investing huge sums of money in merit-based
aid programs, partly in the hope of increasing local human capital concentrations.
4 Data and Methodology
4.1 Data Description
The data used here were provided by the West Virginia Higher Education Policy Commis-
sion (HEPC). The WVHEPC compiled demographic information on graduates from West
Virginia public higher education institutions, including graduates’ PROMISE scholarship
status, gender, race, residency for fee purposes, age, ACT score, graduation year, highest
degree earned, current enrollment status, and area of concentration.5 Data on graduates
during the 2003-2004 to 2006-2007 period is then matched with wage and salary employ-
ment records for 2008 maintained by Workforce West Virginia. All graduates reflect the
highest degree earned at the time of measurement.
Employment is measured by place of work, and covers jobs and wages reported by firms
4See Bevia and Iturbe-Ormaetxe (2002) for details on how low-income families benefit from higher ed-
ucation subsidies to middle-and high-income families. According to their theory, low-income voters favor
middle- and high-income education subsidies (such as merit-based aid) because they assume that those that
are being subsidized will earn higher incomes and pay higher taxes, which will in turn convert into higher and
more adequate redistribution in the future. This could be applied to the U.S. states under the assumption
that graduates will stay working in the state.
5Area of concentration and degree are identified by Classification of Instructional Programs (CIP) codes.
These are eight-digit codes that identify the degree (Associate’s, Bachelor’s, etc), area of concentration
(Business, Education, Engineering, etc), and major (accounting, kindergarten teaching, chemical engineering,
etc) of graduates. An area of concentration is an umbrella classification that includes one or more majors.
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that participate in the West Virginia Unemployment Compensation system. Firms employ-
ing one or more workers for some part of a day in at least 20 different weeks of a calendar
year are required to contribute to the state’s unemployment insurance system. However,
there are certain exceptions such as railroad companies and the federal government, which
contribute to different systems. Additionally, this data set does not cover the self-employed,
student workers, most church workers, and unpaid family workers. A graduate is counted as
employed in the state in 2008 if he/she is employed for at least one quarter during the year.
As Table 2.1 shows, I count with 22,101 observations in the data set. That is the total
number of graduates from West Virginia public higher education institutions during the
2003-2004 to 2006-2007 period for which I have complete information. I initially focus on
this period since it includes all PROMISE graduates to date. Of the 22,101 graduates during
the period, 3,206 were PROMISE recipients for at least one semester, which translates into
a share of 14.5%. Note that most graduates in the sample were female (59.7%), in-state for
fee purposes (92.4%), white (94.8%), earned a Bachelor’s degree (67.4%), and majored in
Business, Education, General Studies, or Health Professions (55.3%). This sample can be
decomposed further by distinguishing between PROMISE and non-PROMISE scholarship
recipients.
PROMISE graduates have similar general characteristics, with 64.0% female, all gradu-
ates in-state (as required), 96.2% white, 80.2% earned a Bachelor’s degree, and 47.9% ma-
jored in Business, Education, General Studies, or Health Professions. Of the non-PROMISE
graduates 59.0% are female, 91.1% in-state residents, 94.5% white, and 65.2% Bachelor’s
degree holders. Note as well that most PROMISE graduates (95.0%) graduated in the last
two years. This reflects the relatively recent implementation of the PROMISE scholarship in
the state. In addition, PROMISE graduates are on average a bit younger than the average
graduate (23.7 years versus 27.0), have higher mean ACT scores (24.3 versus 21.2), and less
experience since graduation (1.5 years versus 2.9 years).
Table 2.1 also presents West Virginia work participation rates for graduates, defined as
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Table 2.1: W.Va. Public Higher Education Graduates And W.Va. Employment In 2007 and
2008
Graduates During 2002-2003 To 2006-2007 Graduates During 2002-2003 To 2006-2007
Percent Percent Percent Percent
Working In Working In Working In Working In
All West Virginia Promise West Virginia All West Virginia Promise West Virginia
Graduates In 2008 Recipients In 2008 Graduates In 2008 Recipients In 2008
Total 22,101 62.77 3,206 62.94 Area of concentration
Gender Agriculture 263 48.29 65 44.62
Female 13,200 64.48 2,053 64.20 Natural Resource 230 69.57 32 68.75
Male 8,901 60.23 1,153 60.71 Architecture 38 26.32 n/d n/d
Residency for fee purposes Communication 941 52.71 175 56.57
In-state 20,418 66.14 3,206 62.94 Comm. Technologies 76 68.42 8 62.50
Out-of-state and other 1,683 21.93 Computer & Info Sci. 299 59.87 46 67.39
Race, age, ACT score Enrollment Culinary 39 66.67 n/d n/d
White 20,944 63.16 3,083 63.38 Education 3,301 70.34 305 71.48
Non-white 1,157 55.66 123 52.03 Engineer 786 49.11 160 46.25
Mean Age 26.63 23.742 Engineer Tech. 493 67.95 59 64.41
Mean ACT Scores 21.25 24.289 Foreign Languages 94 56.38 20 55.00
Enrolled 2,160 68.52 652 61.35 Family Science 303 50.17 25 56.00
Mean Experience 2.35 1.450 Legal Professions 266 68.80 6 50.00
Graduation Year English & Literature 366 58.47 78 55.13
2003-2004 4,530 56.89 44 84.09 General Studies 1,594 64.37 133 70.68
2004-2005 5,256 61.38 115 69.57 Bio Sciences 832 44.71 260 41.54
2005-2006 5,929 63.60 1,081 60.31 Math and Stats 75 50.67 16 50.00
2006-2007 6,386 67.32 1,966 63.53 Multidisciplinary Studies 380 61.84 80 61.25
Degree and Institution Recreation 263 53.61 27 59.26
Undergraduate Cert. 290 80.34 47 89.36 Philosophy 18 33.33 n/d n/d
Associate 3,773 75.06 531 80.04 Physical Sciences 265 45.28 61 34.43
Bachelor 14,890 59.31 2,571 58.97 Science Technology 116 82.76 11 81.82
First Professional 653 60.64 Psychology 849 59.60 165 65.45
Masters 2,455 63.75 57 61.40 Security 866 65.24 71 63.38
Mast Certificate 16 37.50 Public Administration 337 67.66 25 60.00
Doctoral 24 37.50 Social Sciences 818 59.90 135 60.74
Two Year Institution 2,712 75.15 385 78.96 Mechanic & Repair Tech 51 80.39 n/d n/d
Precision Design 55 85.45 n/d n/d
Visual & Perf. Arts 478 51.88 74 64.86
Health Professions 3,367 71.01 514 78.60
Business 3,956 62.11 585 64.44
History 285 60.00 54 72.22
n/d: not disclosed due to confidentiality requirements
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the number of graduates working at establishments in the state divided by the total number
of graduates. Out of the total number of graduates during the past four years, 13,873 worked
at establishments located in West Virginia for at least one quarter in 2008. This is the same
percentage (62.8%) of non-PROMISE graduates in the sample working in West Virginia
in 2008. Work participation rates tend to be higher for women, for in-state graduates,
and for white graduates. Work participation rates also tend to be higher for those earning
Undergraduate Certificates and Associate’s degrees.
I also find that West Virginia work participation rates tend to be highest for the most
recent graduates. Indeed, for graduates during the 2006-2007 academic year, the work par-
ticipation rate in 2008 is 67.3%. In contrast, for graduates during the 2003-2004 academic
year, 56.9% worked in the state in 2008. This pattern may be observed for a variety of
reasons. For instance, graduates with more experience may be more likely to engage in self-
employment (and those will not be covered by this data set). In addition, graduates with
more experience may be more marketable, and thus leave the state to pursue opportunities
elsewhere, or graduates may elect to leave the labor force altogether (and perhaps become a
stay-at-home spouse).
For all PROMISE graduates to date, the work participation rate in 2008 is 62.9% (or
2,108 out of 3,206 graduates). Again, work participation rates are higher for PROMISE
graduates that are female, white, and those that earned an Undergraduate Certificate or
Associate’s degree.
PROMISE graduates have a different pattern for work participation rates by experience.
The rate drops from 63.5% to 60.3% then rises to 84.1% for graduates during the 2003-2004
academic year. However, this pattern is driven by the fact that PROMISE graduates during
the first two years of our data set were heavily influenced by Associate’s degree graduates.
These graduates tend to have much higher work participation rates than Bachelor’s degree
graduates, who dominate the results for the last two years of the sample.
Note from Table 2.1 that the work participation rate in 2008 for PROMISE graduates is
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just above the rate for all graduates during the same period (at 62.9%). However, the work
participation rate for PROMISE graduates is well below the rate for all in-state graduates
(66.1%). This is the crucial comparison, since all PROMISE recipients must be in-state
residents for fee purposes. It suggests that the PROMISE scholarship may not help retain
graduates to work in the state.
In order to more carefully disentangle the influences in work participation in West Vir-
ginia, I now turn to an econometric analysis. This will allow me to estimate the impact
of the PROMISE scholarship on work participation, while controlling for other important
characteristics of graduates.
4.2 Methodology
To estimate the impact of the PROMISE scholarship on work participation in West Virginia,
I use a non-linear probabilistic model that estimates the likelihood of earning wages from
establishments in West Virginia, holding constant the demographic and academic character-
istics available in the data set.
Since I can only observe whether or not a graduate earned wages in the state in 2008,
I create a dummy variable yi, which is defined by yi = 1 if the graduate worked in West
Virginia at least one quarter during 2008, and yi = 0 otherwise. Hence, our latent variable
y∗i is defined as the “propensity to work at an establishment located in West Virginia in
2008.”
Similarly, I create dummy variables for gender, race, residency status, PROMISE recipi-
ent, enrollment, degree, area of concentration, and type of institution that serve as explana-
tory variables. For gender, race, and residency status, the excluded categories are male,
white, and out-of-state graduates. Thus, our dummy variables compare the difference in the
propensity to participate in West Virginia’s workforce between female graduates and male
graduates, non-white versus white, and in-state versus out-of-state graduates.
The enrollment variable indicates whether a recent graduate was enrolled in any other
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higher education program in 2008. Degree, on the other hand, is divided into seven different
categories. I create a dummy variable for each one of these categories (i.e. Undergraduate
Certificate, Associate, Masters, etc.), and do the same for areas of concentration. I exclude
Bachelor’ degree graduates and the Liberal Arts/General Studies area of concentration from
the regression in order to avoid issues of collinearity.
Assuming that the variance of the errors is equal to 1, and that the cumulative distri-
bution function of the errors (F ) is symmetric (e.g. standard normal and standard logistic)
such that 1− F (−Z) = F (Z), the scale of y∗i can be fixed as follows




where xij is a matrix of explanatory variables. From equation (2.1), I estimate the propensity
of graduates to work in West Virginia by maximizing the likelihood function. Thus, the log-
likelihood function is defined as
li(β) = lnF (yi|xi, β) = yi ∗ lnF (x′iβ) + (1− yi) ∗ ln [1− F (x′iβ)], yi = 1, 0 (2.2)
and that likelihood function, L(β) =
∑n




marginal effects for continuous explanatory variables are given by ∂P (y=1|x)
∂xh
= f(β0 + β1x1 +
β2x2 + · · ·+ βkxk) ∗ βh where f(z)dFdz represents the probability density function. Similarly,
∂P (y=1|x)
∂xh
= F (X ′β + δ) − F (X ′β) yields the computed marginal effects for dichotomous
variables when δ is the coefficient in front of the dummy. These marginal effects can be
calculated either at the mean or at specific values of x. Assuming that the errors are
distributed standard normal, I estimate a probit model with the variables mentioned above.
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The model is given by
workparticipation = F (β0 + β1PROMISE + β2ACTscore+ β3Female+ β4InState
+ β5NonWhite+ β6Age+ β7Enrolled+ β8Experience
+ β9TwoY rCol + θDegree+ γAreaStudy) + ε
(2.3)
where workparticipation equals 1 if the graduate worked in West Virginia during any quar-
ter of 2008 and 0 otherwise. PROMISE identifies graduates recipients of the PROMISE
scholarship, while ACTscore proxies for the level of academic achievement. Through the
inclusion of ACT scores I attempt to reduce the selection bias arising from the fact that
the scholarship is awarded to high achieving students, which also tend to be more mobile,
in terms of employment opportunities. Thus, I expect a negative correlation between ACT
scores and the propensity to work in the state.
InState identifies graduates that were classified as in-state for fee purposes. In-state grad-
uates may be more likely to remain in the state after graduation due to family ties. Hence,
I expect a positive association between in-state residents and work participation. Following
the variable description above, Degree and AreaStudy are vectors of dummy variables de-
scribing the academic characteristics of each graduate. This helps to control for the effect of
employment opportunities in West Virginia, as graduates with higher degrees may be more
limited to find suitable employment in the state, choosing to move to other states, or even
other countries. Additionally, due to the industry composition of the state, I expect that
graduates with majors that match with West Virginia’s industry mix will be more likely to
work in the state.
TwoYrCol is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the individual graduated from
a community college or other two-year institution and 0 otherwise. NonWhite identifies the
race of the graduate (0 for white, 1 otherwise) and Enrolled tracks those graduates continuing
their education. While there is no prior on the sign of the coefficient for NonWhite, I expect
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that those that are currently enrolled in the state will be more likely to be employed in West
Virginia. This, however, may not hold if the majority of these enrolled graduates attend
schools in border counties, but are employed in the neighboring state. I do not expect this
to be very likely. Experience controls for the number of years since graduation. Given
that experience may reflect the acquisition of additional marketable skills, more experienced
graduates may be more mobile, and thus less likely to work in West Virginia, compared to
more recent graduates.
5 Empirical Results
Table 2.2 contains the marginal effects from the probit estimation. These effects are evaluated
at values in which the representative graduate is a white male resident of West Virginia with
an Bachelor’s degree in Business, and a non-PROMISE recipient. This assumption facilitates
the interpretation of the results. Model 1 shows the results including the full set of control
variables specified above. After controlling for ACT scores, gender, race, residency, age,
current enrollment status, experience, degree, type of institution, and area of concentration,
I find that PROMISE graduates to date are 3.2 percentage points less likely to work in West
Virginia than graduates that did not receive the scholarship. This estimate is significant at
the 1% level. Moreover, the results provide evidence that, all other things equal, graduates
characterized by high levels of academic achievement are already inclined to work elsewhere.
On average, a one point increase in the ACT score of graduates reduces the likelihood of
earning wages in the state by 0.8 percentage points (also significant at the 1% level).
As noted before, PROMISE scholarship recipients score higher on the ACT. Hence, it
is not surprising to observe a negative correlation between the PROMISE scholarship and
the likelihood of working in the state upon graduation. Furthermore, it appears that the
desire of some PROMISE scholarship recipients to stay in West Virginia after work may be
driven by other personal factors (e.g. family ties). According to the rules, the scholarship
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Table 2.2: Probit Estimation of the Impact of Graduate
Characteristics on W.Va. Work Participation in 2008
All Graduates
During 2002-2003 to 2006-2007
Model 1 Model 2
Marginal Standard Marginal Standard
Variable Effectsa Errors Effectsa Errors
Promise -0.032***b 0.010 -0.019* 0.011
ACT Score -0.008*** 0.001
Personal Characteristics
Female 0.012* 0.007 0.045*** 0.007
In-State Graduate 0.453*** 0.012
Non-white -0.060*** 0.015 -0.089*** 0.015
Age 0.005*** 0.001 0.012*** 0.001
Enrolled 0.056*** 0.010 0.064*** 0.011
Experience -0.042*** 0.003 -0.046*** 0.003
Degree and Institution
Undergraduate Cert. 0.092*** 0.027
Associate 0.107*** 0.015
First Professional -0.089*** 0.025
Masters -0.024** 0.011
Mast Certificate -0.305** 0.127
Doctoral -0.214** 0.108




Bio Sciences -0.102*** 0.022
Business 0.030** 0.014
Comm. Technologies 0.043 0.048
Communication -0.028 0.019




Engineer Tech. 0.026 0.022
English & Literature 0.031 0.024
Family Science -0.076** 0.031
Foreign Languages -0.028 0.049
Health Professions 0.086*** 0.013
History 0.034 0.027
Legal Professions 0.122*** 0.026
Math and Stats 0.001 0.051
Mechanic & Repair Tech 0.098* 0.056
Multidisciplinary Studies 0.022 0.025
Natural Resource 0.073*** 0.028
Philosophy -0.180 0.127
Physical Sciences -0.091*** 0.033
Precision Design 0.131** 0.051
Psychology 0.021 0.019
Public Administration 0.068*** 0.024
Recreation -0.014 0.030
Science Technology 0.127*** 0.036
Security 0.043** 0.018
Social Sciences 0.035* 0.018
Visual & Perf. Arts -0.038 0.025
No. of Observations 22,101 22,101
Pseudo R2 0.0831 0.0116
a Marginal effects calculated at values for which the representative
agent/graduate is a white male resident of West Virginia with an Associate’s
degree in Business and PROMISE scholarship holder.
b Note: ***Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant
at the 10% level.
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can only be awarded to those students who have resided in the state at least one year prior
to college enrollment. In that context, I find that in-state graduates are approximately 45.3
percentage points more likely to work in the state than out-of-state graduates. This result
suggests that many of those scholarship recipients that decide to stay in the state may do
so because of their desire to remain close to their families or other attachments.
However, there are other factors that influence the likelihood of graduates to work in the
state. For example, those who remain in the state to pursue another degree have a higher
propensity to work in the state. This is accentuated for the case of PROMISE graduates
as they are more likely to pursue higher levels of education. In general, about 20.2 percent
of total PROMISE graduates in the sample appear to be enrolled at some point in 2008.
This is twice as much as the total percentage of enrolled graduates when looking at the
entire sample. Even after controlling for enrollment, PROMISE scholarship recipients are
less likely to remain in the state for work. Racial minorities, on the other hand, are also less
likely to work in West Virginia after they graduate from college. Similarly, the propensity
of West Virginia graduates to work in the state decreases with years of experience.
Additionally, controlling for degree and area of concentration brings us back to the fact
that graduates’ location decisions are heavily influenced by the opportunity for work. I find
that, on average, graduates with Associate’s degrees are 10.7 percentage points more likely
to work in West Virginia than a Bachelor’s degree recipient. However, graduates with higher
levels of attainment (Master’s degrees and above) tend to be less likely to work in the state.
Graduates from certain areas of concentration seem to find better opportunities for work
in West Virginia. Education graduates, for instance, are approximately 10.9 percentage
points more likely to work in West Virginia. Engineers, on the other hand, are 5.5 percentage
points less likely to remain in the state for work. Health professions, Security, Mechanic and
Repair Technologies, and Legal professions all show positive and significant effects. On the
other end, graduates with degrees in Biological Science, Physical Science, Architecture, and
Agriculture show negative propensities to work in West Virginia.
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This suggests that the industry mix in West Virginia is not well suited to retaining large
numbers of highly educated residents. The state’s employment mix reflects the importance
of the mining and logging sector, which accounted for 4.0% of state employment in 2008,
compared to just 0.6% for the nation. In contrast, West Virginia has a relatively small share
of jobs in financial activities, information, and professional and business services. Thus, the
state tends to have small shares in sectors that tend to require high levels of educational
attainment.
These initial results suggest that PROMISE scholars are less likely to remain in the state
to work. However, the results may continue to be subject to a selection bias problem. As
stated before, the PROMISE scholarship is awarded to individuals with high abilities and
therefore particularly mobile. This can be more problematic given that the indicator of
academic achievement and individual ability (ACT score) is part of the evaluation criteria
and may be influenced by the availability of the scholarship. In other words, after the
adoption of the scholarship, high-school students had an incentive to work harder to obtain
higher scores and be eligible to receive the award. In order to check the robustness of the
initial results, I include four additional model specifications.
Model 2 in Table 2.2 includes only those demographic variables which are most likely to
be unaffected by the availability of the scholarship. Controlling for age, sex, race, enrollment
after graduation, and experience, I find that PROMISE graduates are 1.9 percentage points
less likely than non-PROMISE graduates to work in the state in 2008. I exclude ACT score,
degree, institution type, and area of concentration from this regression since these may be
influenced by the PROMISE and therefore determined endogenously. The results are similar
to that in Model 1 with the PROMISE coefficient being statistically significant at the 10%
level.
The selection bias issue has not be solved, however. In an attempt to reduce the problem
as much as possible, I include three additional model specifications. Table 2.3 contains results
for these models. Model 3 includes all the control variables included in the full specification
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Table 2.3: Probit Estimation of the Impact of Graduate Characteristics
on W.Va. Work Participation in 2008: Alternative Models
All In-State All Graduates Eligible For PROMISE: 2003-2004 To 2006-2007
Graduates for PROMISE All Eligible for PROMISE
2003-2004 to 2006-2007 2003-2004 To 2006-2007 1995-1996 To 2000-2001
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Marginal Standard Marginal Standard Marginal Standard
Variablea Effectsb Errors Effectsb Errors Effectsb Errors
Promise -0.037***c 0.013 -0.034** 0.016 -0.052** 0.022
ACT Score -0.008*** 0.001 -0.010*** 0.002 -0.008*** 0.001
College GPA -0.026*** 0.008 -0.037*** 0.011 -0.048*** 0.011
Personal Characteristics
Female 0.022*** 0.009 0.020* 0.012 0.003 0.010
Non-white -0.073*** 0.018 -0.083*** 0.030 -0.147*** 0.022
Age 0.007*** 0.002 0.007** 0.003 0.002 0.002
Enrolled 0.064*** 0.013 0.042** 0.017 0.129*** 0.018
Experience -0.049*** 0.004 -0.045*** 0.006 -0.037*** 0.004
Degree and Institution
Undergraduate Cert. 0.001 0.059 -0.008 0.137 0.146** 0.061
Associate 0.116*** 0.020 0.172*** 0.030 0.156*** 0.016
First Professional -0.119*** 0.029 -0.133*** 0.034 -0.013 0.045
Masters -0.019 0.014 0.005 0.018 -0.004 0.020
Mast Certificate -0.151 0.152 0.013 0.293
Doctoral -0.167 0.112 -0.170 0.120
Two Year Institution -0.014 0.025 -0.007 0.043 -0.049** 0.021
Area of Concentration
Agriculture -0.099*** 0.037 -0.100* 0.052 0.062 0.041
Architecture -0.325** 0.080 -0.381*** 0.124 -0.174 0.116
Bio Sciences -0.119*** 0.027 -0.104*** 0.038 -0.035 0.031
Business 0.048** 0.020 0.065* 0.034 0.105*** 0.023
Comm. Technologies 0.048 0.069 0.049 0.127 -0.008 0.063
Communication -0.015 0.025 0.025 0.038 0.027 0.031
Computer & Info Sci. 0.002 0.038 -0.023 0.055 0.097** 0.040
Culinary -0.110 0.102 -0.232 0.233 0.003 0.113
Education 0.153*** 0.017 0.161*** 0.029 0.160*** 0.024
Engineer -0.042 0.027 -0.029 0.039 0.008 0.032
Engineer Tech. 0.035 0.032 0.029 0.054 0.148*** 0.032
English & Literature 0.055* 0.033 0.088** 0.044 0.081** 0.040
Family Science -0.082** 0.038 -0.096 0.065 -0.025 0.041
Foreign Languages -0.065 0.068 -0.065 0.095 0.016 0.084
Health Professions 0.105*** 0.019 0.113*** 0.031 0.173*** 0.023
History 0.055 0.036 0.110** 0.050 0.098** 0.046
Legal Professions 0.167*** 0.035 0.210*** 0.042 0.220*** 0.050
Math and Stats -0.030 0.073 0.013 0.085 -0.144* 0.083
Mechanic & Repair Tech 0.127 0.089 0.037 0.190 0.256*** 0.092
Multidisciplinary Studies 0.002 0.036 0.081 0.053 0.029 0.050
Natural Resource 0.091** 0.036 0.094* 0.056 0.118** 0.044
Philosophy -0.203 0.152 -0.301* 0.166 -0.057 0.220
Physical Sciences -0.109*** 0.039 -0.111** 0.050 -0.044 0.043
Precision Design 0.147* 0.082 -0.334 0.244 0.176** 0.071
Psychology 0.034 0.025 0.060 0.038 0.087*** 0.030
Public Administration 0.084*** 0.032 0.082 0.053 0.138*** 0.039
Recreation 0.003 0.039 -0.006 0.062 0.023 0.045
Science Technology 0.142* 0.082 0.165 0.245 0.116 0.129
Security 0.060** 0.025 0.054 0.045 0.105*** 0.029
Social Sciences 0.055** 0.025 0.078** 0.039 0.059** 0.030
Visual & Perf. Arts -0.054* 0.032 -0.029 0.048 0.047 0.038
No. of Observations 17,710 9,141 14,399
Pseudo R2 0.0437 0.0423 0.0419
a Missing variables have been dropped due to perfect predictability and/or multicollinearity issues.
b Marginal effects calculated at values for which the representative agent/graduate is a white male resident of West Virginia with an
Associate’s degree in Business and PROMISE scholarship holder.
c Note: ***Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level.
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(Model 1), including those that may be affected by the scholarship, but restricts the sample to
in-state graduates only, and controls for college GPA. Since the scholarship is only available
to in-state students, it is reasonable to restrict the sample to those directly affected. Also,
as mentioned above, ACT attempts to control for individual ability. Yet it is not a perfect
measure. A somewhat weaker measure is the high-school GPA. However, I use college GPA
for two reasons. First, the high-school GPA may be influenced by the implementation of
the scholarship. Second, employers are more likely to look at collge GPAs when determining
who to hire, making it more relevant when analyzing labor market outcomes. As the table
shows, the results on PROMISE do not change significantly (-3.7 percentage points).
Model 4 restricts the sample even further. This model attempts to reduce the bias by
comparing similar graduates. Thus, the model uses the highly mobile graduates only. In
other words, only those who are eligible to receive the scholarship. That is, in-state graduates
with minimum high-school GPAs of 3.0 and ACT scores of 21 or better. Again, the results
suggest that PROMISE graduates are 3.4 percentage points less likely to work in the state,
and the coefficient estimate is statistically significant at the 5% level.
Finally, in Model 5, I combine data on graduates that where not subject to the imple-
mentation of the PROMISE scholarship (i.e. graduates from 1995 to 2001) but would have
been eligible under the program’s requirements with that on graduates that received the
PROMISE scholarship after it was implemented. This model excludes the non-PROMISE
graduates that might have been influenced by the implementation of the the scholarship.
This is done in an attempt to improve the performance of the ACT score as an indicator of
ability while attempting to compare groups that are qualitatively similar. Again, the results
(shown in table 2.3) suggest that PROMISE graduates are less likely to work in the state.
This result is also statistically significant at the 5% level.
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6 Conclusions and Policy Implications
The results presented in this paper suggest that merit-based scholarship programs may not
have the intended impact on local human capital retention at the margin. After controlling
for academic achievement, age, race, type of institution, degree, enrollment, and area of
concentration, the results suggest that PROMISE scholarship recipients that have graduated
so far are approximately 1.9 to 5.2 percentage points less likely to work in West Virginia than
graduates that did not receive the scholarship. These results suggest that states which are
considering adopting merit-based scholarship programs should be wary of unqualified claims
that keeping students in a state for college means that they will be more likely to work in
the state after graduation.
It is important to keep in mind as well that the estimated impacts operate at the margin.
I show that 62.8% of PROMISE graduates remain in the state to work after graduation. To
the extent that the scholarship can increase enrollment in state, this likely results in more
graduates remaining in the state to work. Our results point out that the impact is smaller
than one would expect from an examination of the behavior of in-state graduates alone.
Indeed, the scholarship may provide incentives on the first margin (remaining in state for
college), but not on the last one when they face labor market decisions. This is illustrated in
Table 2.4, in which I estimate the contribution of the first two classes to receive the PROMISE
scholarship to human capital accumulation in the state. This simulation assumes that all
PROMISE recipients during the 2002-2003 and 2003-2004 years were incoming freshmen that
would have left the state for college if not for PROMISE.6
I use four-year and five-year graduation rates (and PROMISE impacts) reported in West
Virginia Higher Education Policy Commission (2008) and Scott-Clayton (2008). These esti-
mates suggest a positive marginal impact for the PROMISE scholarship on graduation rates,
raising the five-year rate by 4.0 percentage points (from 51%) and the four-year rate by 6.7
percentage points (from 26%). I apply the five-year graduation rate to the class of 2002-2003
6I do not have formal estimates of the enrollment impact of the scholarship in West Virginia.
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and the four-year rate to the class of 2003-2004.
Under the assumption that all PROMISE recipients would have left the state, if not for
the scholarship, we have a total of 2,919 graduates by 2006-2007 (of which PROMISE adds
338). Next, I apply the work participation rate for all graduates in 2006-2007 (67.3%) and
adjust for our (negative) estimate of the impact of the scholarship on work participation in
2008.7 These estimates suggest that the full impact of the scholarship on the first two classes
results in 1,865 graduates working in the state in 2008 (with the PROMISE impact at -93
graduates, using the mid-range estimate of -3.2 percentage points). The marginal impact
of the scholarship is large for enrollment (by assumption), positive on the graduation rate,
and negative on the work participation rate. Note that I have assumed that all PROMISE
recipients would have left the state for college if not for PROMISE. If, however, the data
showed that some percent of these high-achieving students would have enrolled in higher
education institutions in the state even in the absence of the scholarship, the overall impact
of the program would decline. After all, it is important to remember that such programs
may not affect enrollment in some states (See Pallais (2009)).
As a long-term investment, the cost of the program may not justify the small marginal
benefits that it may provide. Even though a decent amount of PROMISE graduates remain
in the state to work after graduation, it must be noted that 32.7% of those graduates in the
sample does not appear to be working in the state in 2008. As I have mentioned before,
this group of graduates tend to be more mobile, which may lead them to seek employment
somewhere else regardless of the scholarship.
For instance, out of the 6,415 non-PROMISE in-state graduates with ACT scores of 22 or
higher during the academic years 2003-2004 to 2006-2007, 60.9% worked at establishments
located in West Virginia in 2008. This is just 1.9 percentage points below the in-state work
participation rate of the PROMISE graduates. This suggests that this costly program may
not have much of an overall effect in changing the work decisions of this group of highly
7For simplicity, I abstract from the fact that work participation rates decline with experience. This tends
to increase the total impact slightly
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Table 2.4: Illustration of PROMISE Impacts
2002-2003 2003-2004 Total
(1) New Promise Recipientsa 3,555 2,920 6,475
Graduation Ratesa,b
(2) Five-Year Graduation Rate 51.0% – –
(3) PROMISE Marginal Impact 4.0% – –
(4) Four-Year Graduation Rate – 26.0% –
(5) PROMISE Marginal Impact – 6.7% –
Graduates By 2006-2007
(6) Graduates Class 2002-2003 (1) ∗ (2) 1,813 – 1,813
(7) PROMISE Marginal Impact Class 2002-2003(1) ∗ (3) 142 – 142
(8) Graduates Class 2003-2004 (1) ∗ (4) – 759 759
(9) PROMISE Marginal Impact Class 2003-2004 (1) ∗ (5) – 196 196
(10) Total Graduates 1,955 955 2,910
Work Participation Rate 2008
(11) All Graduates Rate 2006-2007 67.3% 67.3% –
(12) PROMISE Marginal Impact -3.2% -3.2% –
Working In 2008
(13) All Graduates (10) ∗ (11) 1,316 643 1,958
(14) PROMISE Marginal Impact (10) ∗ (12) -63 -31 -93
(15) Total Working In 2008 1,253 612 1,865
a West Virginia Higher Education Policy Commission (2008)
b Scott-Clayton (2008)
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marketable graduates. Thus, the marginal overall impact seems not to be enough to justify
the increasing costs of this program.
This analysis also highlights the importance of the demand for labor in the state as a
determinant of the extent to which graduates remain in West Virginia to work. As shown,
Engineers, Biology Scientists, and Physical Scientists are all less likely to work in West
Virginia. These results suggest that policy makers need to account for employment opportu-
nities in the state, when judging the likely impact of programs to attract and retain educated
residents and workers. Hence, it is important that policy makers not only focus on policies
that aim at educating the state’s labor force, but also on policies that promote investment
and the creation opportunities for higher-education graduates. Additionally, while this anal-
ysis may be criticized with allegations of selection bias problems, one must not forget that
policy makers are the ones selecting these highly mobile individuals who even after staying
in the state for college may be tempted to leave in search of better opportunities.
This study also posits additional questions. Assuming that the scholarship does have a
great impact on in-state enrollment in West Virginia, policy makers must take into account
what this means in terms of the quality of education obtained by the students that end
up staying in the state for work. The scholarship may change the enrollment behavior
of high achieving students such that the suboptimal outcome of students not attending
more prestigious schools may result. If, due to strong family ties, some of these students
decided to seek employment in the state after graduation regardless of school choice, the
state would be forgoing the opportunity to have employees with perhaps better connections
and higher quality training. One avenue for additional research would be to explore different
classifications of employment. For instance, one important characteristic of the data used in
this study is that it includes only graduates working at establishments in the state. Like most
states in the northeastern U.S., some West Virginia residents commute to jobs outside of
the state. Implementing matches of higher education data with information on employment
by place of residence across all states would also provide useful information. In particular,
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it would allow researchers to distinguish between policies that encourage work in the state
versus residence in the state.
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Chapter 3
The Work Disincentives Created by
Government Safety Nets Continue:
Analysis of TANF
1 Introduction
Government-provided aid to low-and-moderate income families constitutes a significant share
of the national budget. In 2006, public welfare expenditures accounted for approximately
24% of the U.S. states’ total budgets.1 Programs available to eligible families include, but
are not limited to, Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF), Supplemental Nutrition As-
sistance Program (SNAP), housing subsidies and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).
These programs provide financial assistance to households with incomes below certain income
thresholds and have been constructed to phase-out benefits as household income increases.
Unintended employment disincentives are created by the combination of the programs’
benefit reduction designs with the cumulative effect of tax schedules (Holt and Romich, 2007).
Increasing working hours, and consequently earned income, results in the slow phasing out of
1Source: State Government Finances U.S. Census Bureau.
33
benefits received, which in turn may translate into high ‘implicit’ marginal tax rates (IMTR).
These depend, among other things, on the families’ choice of program participation. IMTR’s
will also vary by family composition (i.e. married versus single, or number of children), the
number of programs in which the family participates, the amount of earnings (or number of
hours worked), the state of residence, and the cost of living associated with each geographic
location. When the phase-out of the various programs are considered, the result may be
an increase in disposable income significantly less than the marginal increase of earned
income for eligible households, in many occasions off-setting the positive effects of the EITC
documented by Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000). This may create the undesirable outcome
of an individual being better off in terms of wealth by earning $25,000 a year compared to
earning $35,000 year.2
Aligning the incentives of assisting households in need without discouraging work par-
ticipation is an important policy debate. The literature to date has focused on the impact
of the implicit marginal tax rates faced by representative eligible households on labor sup-
ply for different time periods, geographical areas, or benefit use packages. However, while
variation among states already existed for some programs, the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) reformed the welfare system so
that each state now had more freedom to modify cash benefit packages that were previously
controlled by stricter federal rules, which would increase the level of state variation. As a
result, the employment decision faced by eligible households is now subject to the welfare
rules and program interaction in each state of residency.
Following previous literature, here I calculate the implicit marginal tax rate faced by a
representative eligible household at various earning levels for all 50 states. I aggregate the
benefits for which a representative low-income household is eligible under their respective
state guidelines for different earning levels. Incorporating assumptions regarding cost of
living and earning potential, I am able to construct IMTR tables for each state. I then
2http://content.ksg.harvard.edu/blog/jeff_frankels_weblog/2008/02/08/8/
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consider the differences in states’ labor supply rates of households receiving benefits and
I use the variation in states’ IMTRs to explain the states’ difference in welfare recipients’
workforce participation rates.
To my knowledge, this is the first attempt to calculate the potential IMTRs faced by the
representative welfare recipient for all 50 states under rules adopted after the 1996 reform,
and use them to explain inter-state variation in the overall labor supply rates of households
receiving benefits. Using state aggregated data for labor supply of welfare recipients allows
me to investigate the impact of the incentive structures- represented by these IMTRs- created
by the difference in program rules on state efforts to decrease overall dependance on welfare
and promote employment rates.
Garfinkel and Orr (1974) found a negative correlation between welfare tax rates and
state employment rates for AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) recipients.
However, they use tax rates derived from participating in the cash-benefit program only. On
the other hand, Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000) provide results confirming the positive effects
of the EITC rules on employment.3 However, instead of analyzing the effect of each program
in isolation but all of them combined represented by one single implicit tax rate, I find that
high IMTRs stemming from multiple program participation across U.S. states after the 1996
welfare reform do have negative effects on these families’ workforce participation rates. The
negative impact persists even under different model specifications, and control for potential
labor market spillovers.
The statistical results are based on the definition of work participation provided by the
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), and the simulated implicit tax rates
described above. While not all welfare recipients may participate in all available programs
(Holt and Romich, 2007), data from the DHHS shows that a vast majority of recipients
participate in at least two (Food Stamps or SNAP and TANF) and claim the tax benefits
given by the Earned Income Tax Credits. After only considering these widely used programs,
3See also Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001), Meyer (2009), and Eissa and Liebman (1996)
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and controlling for state characteristics, the inverse relationship between these marginal tax
rates and work participation of welfare recipients persists.
Coupled with the potential high “tax” rates that these low-income individuals can face
in the event of participating in more assistance programs, this paper addresses an important
policy issue as the structure of some welfare benefits may increase the disincentives to start
working and abandon the welfare rolls. This will raise the overall costs of uncoordinated wel-
fare programs to some states as a higher percent of recipients prefer to lower the work effort
and depend instead on government assistance. Additionally, it sheds light on the importance
of monitoring and enforcing work requirements as the disincentives are more severe when
households are given exemptions, while slowly transitioning into full-time employment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the literature,
Section 3 describes the methodology and data, Section 4 presents the results and Section 5
concludes.
2 Literature Review
Marginal tax rates have historically been, and continue to be, an important issue in the
welfare literature. In economics, as much as in the public policy literature, researchers have
been concerned with the effect of welfare programs on the effective tax rates faced by low-and-
middle income families that participate in those programs. More importantly, economists
have been particularly concerned with the impact of those tax rates on the labor-supply
decisions of these individuals. Previous studies have already focused on the labor supply
outcomes of welfare recipients that participate in one, two, or more programs at the same
time. This, however, has become even more interesting as states started adopting the new
rules and regulations implemented after the 1996 welfare reform and comparisons were made
possible.
Most studies analyzing the pre-reform cash-assistance program (Aid to Families with
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Dependent Children AFDC) found negative impacts on labor supply. Garfinkel and Orr
(1974) and Williams (1975) find negative elasticities of employment rate of female heads
of household with respect to the take-up (tax) rate imbedded in the phase-out mechanism
of the program. Moffitt (1983) and Hausman (1981) use individual data to estimate the
labor supply response of female heads of households to different welfare-program parameters
given the kink in the budget constraints created by AFDC, when accounting for federal and
state income taxes and participation in other programs. Their results with respect to the
AFDC tax rate differ both economically and statistically. Keane and Moffitt (1998) use a
structural model of labor supply and welfare stigma under multiple-program participation.
They find that combined tax rates have modest impacts on labor supply given that reduced
rates increase the probability of program entry. 4
In 1996, however, the PRWORA provided that earnings from work should actually raise
disposable income of welfare recipients. The reform aimed at reducing the work disincentives
found in the AFDC system in previous research. It included a series of stipulations that
supported mothers with children by promoting work through child-care subsidies (Haskins,
2002; Sawhill and Haskins, 2002). However, it has been found that a combination of benefit
schedules may result in implicit taxation that may not remove those disincentives found
under the previous system. Recent work has focused on specific states5 (e.g. Wolf (2002)).
Holt and Romich (2007) discuss some of the most recent studies regarding IMTRs faced
by the representative family using post-reform rules. Using different points in time, as well as
specific geographic areas, they highlight the IMTR calculations found by Wilson and Cline
(1994); Shaviro (1999); Sammartino, Toder and Maag (2002); Wolf (2002). According to
Holt and Romich (2007), these studies are informative but limited given the nature of the
calculations. Not all individuals participate in the same programs, creating a wide variation
4See Levy (1979) for similar conclusions. Also, Danziger, Haveman and Plotnick (1981) provide a com-
prehensive review on income transfers prior to the reform.
5This has been defined as a single mother of two children. This has become the icon of much of the
welfare analysis as it has been used by federal government publications such as the Green Book (U.S. House
of Representatives). Data also show that a great percentage of TANF recipients are single mothers, and that
the average family has 1.8 to to 2 children.
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of IMTRs among individuals/families even if they are subject to the same rules. They use
individual data for the state of Wisconsin to look at the distribution of IMTRs across the
state population. Additionally, Moffitt (2002) studies the rules under TANF and reviews
the research on both TANF and AFDC. Blank (2002) evaluates the welfare reform and also
provides a thorough review of much of the recent research on reform impacts.
More recently, Meyer and Sullivan (2004) analyze consumption patterns to evaluate the
effect of the reform on the well-being of single and less educated mothers. While some
advocate the use of individual level data, the literature also acknowledges the downfalls of the
sources as much of it is drawn from surveys and are subject to decreased accuracy.6 Hence, I
analyze state aggregated data which allows me to (1) focus on more accurate administrative
data and (2) look at the overall effects on the states’ efforts to increase employment rates of
low-income individuals with the implementation of the reform rules.
3 Methodology and Data
3.1 Program Description
To calculate the IMTRs for all 50 states, I consider the following benefit programs: TANF,
food stamps (currently known as SNAP), WIC (Women and Infant Care), child care sub-
sidies, housing subsidies and Medicaid/SCHIP. Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF)
is a cash transfer which was implemented in 1996, replacing the AFDC (Aid to Families
with Dependent Children). Under the program, recipients must get a job as soon as possible
with a maximum unemployment time of two years. Initially, only 25% of recipients had to
participate in “work related activities” but by the fiscal year 2000, the requirement was a
minimum of 30 hours per month in most states. However, these are general outlines and spe-
cific requirements vary by state. For example, some states define work activity as schooling,
6Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000) state additional difficulties with the use of structural models to analyze
labor-supply decisions of each individuals.
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training or skill development. Work hours required range from 20 in some states to 40 in
others. Eligibility depends on income, assets, and the presence of dependent children under
the age of 18 (Lugaila, 2005).
Food stamps (now SNAP) are provided by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and
eligibility guidelines are such that individuals eligible for TANF are generally eligible for
food stamps. While some argue that this is an in-kind benefit rather than a cash transfer,
others argue that it frees up money that households would otherwise allocate for food to
be used elsewhere (Lugaila, 2005). As such, it may be treated as a cash transfer. Women
and Infant Care is a supplemental nutrition program for women, infants and children under
the age of 5 with income less than 185% of the poverty line, according to the U.S. Poverty
Income Guidelines, and be nutritionally at risk. Benefits are paid in the form of vouchers
or checks to buy groceries specified by a professional doctor or clinic associated with the
program. The program includes non-tangible benefits such as education and counseling for
participating mothers.
Medicaid is a form of health care designed to service those whose income falls below
133% of the poverty line, although some states opt to cover individuals up to 185% of the
poverty line. Since this benefit cannot be captured quantitatively (except for a case-by-case
basis), its eligibility is reported but not counted when calculating the IMTRs. Housing
subsidies may take the form of availability of public housing or a supplement to cover rent
in low-income areas. Guidelines are set at the federal level and are dependent on income
and location. However, public housing is subject to supply constraints and many eligible
individuals do not have access to the benefit. Child care subsidies are closely tied to TANF
and as such, vary across states. Typically there is a subsidy provided which is dependent
on the number of children, type of child care, and income. This program is often considered
part of TANF because the goal is to provide resources to parents as they gain work skills
and/or experience.
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3.2 Calculating Implicit Marginal Tax Rates
The implicit marginal tax faced by welfare eligible individuals is given by the marginal loss
in disposable income resulting from an increase in earned income when all tax implications
and benefit reductions are taken into consideration. In order to calculate the IMTRs, I use
a hypothetical representative welfare recipient participating in all programs for which she is
eligible. In accordance with previous examinations, this study uses a single parent with two
children who is within the 60 month limit to receive TANF. Holt and Romich (2007) argue
that the examination of this representative household is useful given its frequent reference
in anti-poverty policy debates. Indeed, TANF reports cite that the average family recipient
has 1.8 children, providing great support for the single parent, two children assumption.7
The tax implication calculation is comprised of the state and federal tax liability caused
by additional earned income as well as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). I use the
tax and transfer rules in place for the year 2005. Federal tax liability follows guidelines
established on the Federal 1040 form and state tax liability is computed using TurboTax
2005 software. Families are assumed to take all tax credits and deductions for which they are
entitled, including the assumption that all children are claimed as dependents. Furthermore,
it is assumed that adults do not make contributions to tax-exempt vehicles such as a 401-K
or Individual Retirement Accounts. No local taxes are included in the calculation. In some
cases tax liabilities prior to EITC benefits may be negative, in which case income would
increase due to the entitlement of a refundable credit that exceeds the tax liability. This
illustrates the nature of the EITC implicit tax rates as it is positive at low levels of income
(the group described here) and negative at higher earning levels. The EITC is calculated
according to federal guidelines for 2005. This positive effect can be magnified by the state’s
EITC.
The benefit reduction calculation incorporates TANF, Medicaid eligibility, food stamps,
7 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services: Administration for Children and Families http:
//www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/data-reports/annualreport8/chapter10/chap10.htm
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WIC, subsidized housing and child care subsidies. Information on TANF recipient guidelines
follow the rules obtained from the Welfare Rules Database (WRD) for 2005.8 Medicaid
benefits are difficult to quantify and are thus relegated to noting if the family is eligible to
receive benefits. Federally established rules regarding food stamps refer to the rules outlined
on the Food and Nutritious Service (FNS) website and are used to account for food stamp
benefit levels. Women and Infant Care (WIC) benefits are taken to be the average value per
person per month by type of recipient and are the same for all states. Subsidized housing
benefits are calculated using the average rent payments by food stamps recipients in 2006
obtained from the American Community Survey (ACS), information on fair market rents
(FMR) for the lowest quintiles of the largest county in each state obtained from the Housing
and Urban Development website, and the federal guidelines and co-payment rules. Child
care subsidy eligibility and benefit amount are taken from the Child Care and Development
Fund (CCDF) State Plans, while the child care costs for 2006 are obtained from the National
Association of Child Care Resource & Referral Agencies (NACCRRA). If a plan differs within
the state, the guidelines in the most populous region are used.
It is important to note that the phase-outs of benefits with respect to each program are
interdependent. As such, the analysis is not one of simply calculating the benefits of all pro-
grams independently and aggregating them, but rather requires simultaneous consideration
of all benefits. For example, Table 3.1 shows computation results of monthly food stamp
benefits (SNAP) and house subsidies for the case of Colorado at different levels of earnings.
Panel A illustrates the typical monthly amounts for which a single mother with two children
under the age of five is eligible. At an hourly wage rate of $7.28, a mother with two kids
would have to work an average of 45.6 hours per week in order to reach the federal poverty
threshold for the year 2006 ($16,600 for a family of three). Given this wage rate, available
tax credits and other benefit programs, it is easy to observe how the net income of this
8Developed by the Urban Institute and funded by the Department of Health and Human Services and
the Administration for Children and Families (http://anfidata.urban.org/wrd).
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mother may be affected as she works longer shifts.9
However, contrary to what one may believe, some benefits do not phase-out steadily.
TANF benefits, for instance, decrease as the individual goes from unremunerated employ-
ment to working for pay to increasing the number of hours worked per week at the same
wage rate. Yet, before reaching 20-hour work weeks, her monthly benefits increase rather
than decrease. Although this may seem counterintuitive not all states follow strict benefit
reduction rules. In West Virginia, for instance, benefits are usually reduced at a rate of 40%,
after accounting for program interactions. However, as the interaction of several programs in
Colorado causes this reduction rate to vary. As the table shows, TANF benefits are reduced
initially by 3.1%, then by 13.1%, and then by 15.0% before they climb back up.
Food Stamps (SNAP) and housing subsidies exhibit similar patterns. This results from
the fact that benefits are often determined by the availability of other benefits. Panel B
illustrates how these housing subsidies are calculated for the case specified above. Note
that personal income is composed of both earnings and TANF benefits. After independently
calculating the child care subsidies, the program takes the amount of final child care expenses
as given and subtracts it from the personal income. Additionally, a standard deduction ($40
per dependent) is subtracted from it, arriving to the net income calculation shown in the
second row of Panel B.
The program then calculates an income-based rent that selects the maximum amount
between 10% of the gross personal income or 30% of the net income. Finally it subtracts
this amount from the assumed rent ($742 in this case) to calculate the final house subsidy.
However, as child care subsidies phase-out and the mother has to front a larger percent of the
bill, it affects the amount of deductions allowed to calculate the income-based rent, impacting
the amount of housing subsidies allowed. Thus when child care expenses go from $96 to $170
9My calculations mimic those of the Net Income Calculator (NIC) following the rules and assumptions
put forth by the Urban Institute through it’s Low Income Working Families Project. My calculations are
compared to simulations conducted using the beta version of the NIC. While my results are similar to those
found for the simulations, all errors are mine. The comparison of the results for the two methods act as a
robustness check of the consistency of the two methods.
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per month, for example, income net of deductions decreases, driving the income-based rent
down and rising the subsidy.
Food Stamps (SNAP) benefits for the same case are calculated on Panel C. Like house
subsidies, some deductions are taken when calculating the benefit amount. First, 20% of the
earned income is deducted from the personal income, as defined above. Second, child care
expenses are also deducted up to a maximum of $175 per child, where families with younger
kids enjoy higher deductions. Third, a standard deduction is taken into consideration ($134
in this case), yielding what is referred on the table as ‘Remaining Income.’ The shelter
expense is given by the income-based rent and is added to a telephone allowance of $26 a
month. Additionally, the calculation allows for a deduction of excess shelter expense and
covers up to $391 a month for this specific case. According to the rules there is an excess
shelter expense if the difference between the shelter expense plus the telephone allowance
and half of the ‘Remaining Income’ is greater than zero.
The final net income is then calculated by subtracting the excess shelter deduction from
the calculated remaining income. Given the maximum allowance of $395 per month for a
family of three in Colorado, the benefit is calculated by subtracting 30% of the calculated
net income from the maximum allowance. Note that it uses the part of the rent that is not
covered by the housing subsidy to calculate the shelter and telephone allowance used in the
final benefit calculation. This has a significant influence in explaining the variation of IMTR
among states.
The remainder of the implicit marginal tax rate calculation relies on incorporating the
changes in cost of living associated with changes in work hours and geographic location.
Naturally, the calculation is sensitive to assumptions regarding the representative recipient
with respect to child care costs, wages and rent. For my analysis I assume that the single
parent with two children pays child care at an hourly rate using an average rate for the state.
For simplicity, I assume that child care is not needed until the mother works part-time (20
hours per week). Before that she uses other resources such as friends and relatives. This
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Table 3.1: Calculation of Housing Subsidies and Food Stamps (SNAP) for
COLORADO
Welfare Monthly Benefits
Panel A: Monthly Benefits in Colorado
Hours Worked (Week) 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Monthly Earnings ( $7.28 /Hr) 0 157 315 473 630 788 946 1,104 1,261
Total Tax Creditsa 0 51 102 153 204 255 298 310 308
TANF 357 346 301 256 290 0 0 0 0
SNAP 328 293 268 244 225 304 284 269 237
Housing Subsidy 659 615 581 547 519 581 553 528 548
Child Care Expenses 0 0 0 0 96 170 235 310 533
Panel B: Housing Subsidies
Cash (Earnings + TANF) 357 503 616 729 920 788 944 1,104 1,261
Income Net of Deductionsb 277 423 536 649 744 538 631 714 648
Income-based Rent (IBR) c 83 127 161 195 223 161 214 194 205
Subsidy d 659 615 581 547 519 581 553 528 548
Panel C: SNAP Benefits
Earnings Deduction (20%) 0 31.4 63 94.6 126 158 189 221 252
Child Care Deduction e 0 0 0 0 96 170 235 310 350
Remaining Income f 223 338 419 500 564 326 388 439 525
IBR + Phone Allowance 109 153 187 221 249 187 215 240 220
Excess Shelter Deductiong 0 0 0 0 0 24.2 21.4 20.6 0
Final Net Income h 223 338 419 500 564 302 366 419 419
Maximum Allowance (3 Persons) 395 395 395 395 395 395 395 395 395
SNAP Benefit i 328 294 269 245 226 304 285 269 238
a Includes Federal and state taxes and all other credits from the EITC (Earned Income Tax
Credit).
b Net income after taking the child care expenses and dependent deduction ($40 per depen-
dent) into account.
c Rent/Shelter Expense calculated as the maximum of 10% of the gross and 30% of the net
income.
d Based on average rent ($742) minus the rent/shelter expense.
e Deduction of child care expenses up to $175 per kid.
f Total cash income minus earned income deduction, child care deduction, and standard
deduction ($134)
g Takes the maximum value between 0 and the difference between IBR plus phone allowance
and half of the remaining income without exceeding $391.
h Remaining income minus the excess shelter deduction.
i Maximum allowance minus 30% of the final net income.
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potentially affects the calculated implicit tax rate as it could change if the mother used child
care the minute she starts working.10
For scenarios where employment is undertaken, she is eligible for work which commands
the levels equivalent to the current minimum wage for the respective state. Although benefits
are determined by the total earnings, I assume that low skilled individuals do not start
working at higher wages until they reach full-employment. In any case, keeping the minimum
wage constant raises total earnings when hours worked increase. I assume that housing costs
represent the average monthly rent paid by low-income individuals in 2006, found in the
American Community Survey (ACS). These rent averages vary by geographic location and
not by earning levels. For all scenarios, the adult is assumed to own one car valued no more
than $2,000 and the sum of all other assets do not exceed $1,000. Additionally, I assume
that the family does not receive child care support from the absent parent.
Taking the tax liability, benefit reduction and lifestyle considerations into account, the
implicit marginal tax rate schedule can be calculated for any change in hours worked ranging
from zero hours to forty hours (and any range in between) for all states. For any case, the
IMTR is calculated by subtracting the ratio of the change in disposable income resulting
from a change in hours worked from 1. In other words, the formula is given by IMTR =
1 − 4DisposableIncome4EarnedIncome . Table 3.2 shows the different implicit marginal tax rates for all states
for three different scenarios.
The first scenario calculates the IMTR when working hours for the representative mother
of two increases by ten hours from zero, ten, twenty and thirty hours per week. The second
scenario considers increments of twenty hours from zero hours and twenty hours. This
represents going from not working to part-time status and from part-time to full-time status
with respect to hours worked. The third scenario calculates the IMTR for the case of going
from not working (zero hours) to full-time work (forty hours). All scenarios are calculated
for each state assuming the state’s minimum wage for 2006. The only benefit program which
10Previous literature such as Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000) asserts that the use of informal child care is
very realistic for this group of individuals.
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does not influence the implicit marginal tax rate is WIC since it is an in-kind benefit and
the value is reported as a constant average. A discussion of the variation in IMTR of the
states can be found in Section 4.
3.3 Additional Data
In addition to the marginal change in disposable income, workforce participation rates are
assumed to be dependent on gender, race, location (rural or urban), age and the unem-
ployment rate. All variables are measured at the state level. Gender is the percent of the
population that is female. The racial component is captured by including percent of the
population that is black, while age is controlled for using the percent of the population that
is over 65. Location is the percent of the population that live in rural conditions. Informa-
tion for all control variables except the unemployment rate is from the Census for the year
2006 and the unemployment rate is obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
The choice of control variables follows analyses of the welfare participation and poverty.
Since I am considering the labor participation of welfare recipients, I follow Kasper (1968)
with respect to the choice of control variables. He analyzed the influence of state charac-
teristics on poverty and welfare participation for urban and rural areas. Presumably, the
determinants of welfare participation will also be determinants of labor force participation of
welfare recipients with the opposite influence (since one is closely analogous to the opposite
of the other). Additionally, the analysis includes the simulated implicit marginal tax rates
found for the various scenarios described above. The dependent variable, work participation
of TANF recipients, is obtained from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
in their Eighth Annual Report to Congress.
Following Garfinkel and Orr (1974), I check the robustness of the results by including
some of the control variables they used when determining AFDC employment rates. These
include the percent of TANF recipients with levels of education no higher than the 9th grade,
the maximum amount of TANF guarantee for each state, the percent of families with children
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under 6 years of age, and the population density. The last one is obtained from the Census
Bureau, while the former ones are obtained from the appendix of the Eighth Annual Report
to Congress.
4 Results
4.1 Implicit Marginal Tax Rates
Table 3.2 summarizes the calculation of implicit marginal tax rates (IMTR) for all 50 states
under three different scenarios. For all cases, the simulations assume a single mother of
two children under 5 that participates in the most widely known available programs. Table
3.2 displays the IMTRs to which these families are subject when the mother increases the
working hours. In the first case, it calculates the IMTRs by increasing working time by 10
hours per week. The second column group displays the IMTRs under the assumption that
the mother goes from not working to working 20 hours a week (part-time) and from 20 hours
to 40 hours a week (full-time). Finally, the last column shows the IMTRs that stem from
being fully dependent on welfare programs to working full time at the state’s minimum wage.
For simplicity and ease of reference, table 3.2 is then summarized by the table 3.3 below.
The table shows that in many cases these implicit marginal tax rates do not follow any
specific pattern. For instance, South Carolina is among the top 5 states with highest IMTRs
created when going from working 0 hours a week to working full time (63.00%). Yet they
are amongst the states with the lowest IMTRs corresponding to a switch from full-welfare
dependency to part-time employment (23.54%). Arkansas, on the other hand, experiences a
complete different result. The simulated marginal tax rate for Arkansas for the 0 to 40-hour
scenario is among the lowest (31.61%), while the one for the 0 to 20-hour scenario ranks
third at 95.51%.
The distributions of the implicit marginal tax rates described in these two scenarios also







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.3: Summary of Implicit Marginal Tax Rates (IMTR) Under Mul-
tiple Welfare Program Participation
10-Hour Increments 20-Hour Increments 40-Hour Increment Effective IMTR
0 to 10 10 to 20 20 to 30 30 to 40 0 to 20 20 to 40 0 to 40† 0 to 10
ALABAMA 52.02% 37.22% 27.80% 45.29% 44.62% 36.55% 40.58% 47.98%
ARIZONA 39.01% 48.43% 44.39% 33.63% 43.72% 39.01% 41.37% 9.42%
ARKANSAS 55.61% 135.43% 61.43% -126.01% 95.52% -32.29% 31.61% 59.19%
CALIFORNIA 26.03% 41.44% 41.98% 63.01% 33.73% 52.48% 43.11% -0.34%
COLORADO 26.46% 35.87% 45.74% 146.64% 31.17% 96.19% 63.68% -19.28%
CONNECTICUT 21.56% 21.81% 25.00% 41.12% 21.68% 33.07% 27.38% -8.75%
DELAWARE 21.43% 36.47% 48.69% 80.08% 28.95% 64.35% 46.67% -29.32%
FLORIDA 27.08% 41.52% 41.88% 66.55% 34.30% 54.23% 44.27% -18.41%
GEORGIA 23.32% 129.15% -21.97% 60.99% 76.23% 19.51% 47.87% -32.29%
IDAHO 33.18% 49.33% 48.88% 26.01% 41.26% 37.44% 39.35% -8.07%
ILLINOIS 32.74% 38.30% 46.26% 84.40% 35.52% 65.36% 50.44% -0.71%
INDIANA 30.94% 32.29% 32.74% 32.29% 31.61% 32.51% 32.06% -9.42%
IOWA 37.67% 154.71% -79.82% 52.02% 96.19% -13.90% 41.14% 9.87%
KANSAS 29.60% 39.91% 39.46% 39.46% 34.75% 39.46% 37.11% 0.90%
KENTUCKY 29.15% 47.98% 49.78% 64.57% 38.57% 57.17% 47.87% -17.04%
LOUISIANA 23.77% 92.83% -18.39% 52.02% 58.30% 16.82% 37.56% -32.29%
MAINE 21.52% 31.39% 39.46% 41.70% 26.46% 40.58% 33.52% 3.56%
MARYLAND 37.22% 37.59% 31.09% 77.82% 37.41% 54.41% 45.92% 20.68%
MASSACHUSETTS 27.40% 35.62% 40.27% 136.30% 31.51% 88.21% 59.88% 6.16%
MICHIGAN 32.23% 53.82% 49.17% 87.38% 43.02% 68.27% 55.65% 3.99%
MINNESOTA 32.33% 32.33% 32.58% 65.04% 32.33% 48.78% 40.56% 21.80%
MISSISSIPPI 29.15% 66.82% 7.17% 22.42% 47.98% 14.80% 31.39% -19.28%
MISSOURI 23.32% 31.84% 34.98% 43.05% 27.58% 39.01% 33.30% -32.29%
MONTANA 24.66% 52.02% 51.12% 60.54% 38.34% 55.83% 47.09% -8.97%
NEBRASKA 22.87% 35.43% 53.81% 52.91% 29.15% 53.36% 41.26% -30.04%
NEVADA 41.70% 41.70% 41.26% 34.08% 41.70% 37.67% 39.69% 17.94%
NEW HAMPSHIRE 41.70% 41.70% 65.02% 114.35% 41.70% 89.69% 65.70% 26.91%
NEW JERSEY 33.46% 150.00% -79.78% 60.15% 91.73% -9.94% 40.85% 9.77%
NEW MEXICO 28.70% 42.15% 46.64% 45.74% 35.43% 46.19% 40.81% 6.28%
NEW YORK 25.34% 32.19% 32.76% 89.73% 28.77% 61.20% 45.00% 7.19%
NORTH CAROLINA 36.77% 204.93% -121.08% 32.29% 120.85% -44.39% 38.23% 4.04%
NORTH DAKOTA 21.52% 29.15% 41.70% 17.49% 25.34% 29.60% 27.47% 3.59%
OHIO 21.52% 39.46% 41.26% 43.95% 30.49% 42.60% 36.55% -23.32%
OKLAHOMA 30.49% 39.46% 40.81% 43.95% 34.98% 42.38% 38.68% -11.21%
OREGON 41.36% 63.38% 38.77% 74.15% 52.39% 56.46% 54.43% 20.68%
PENNSYLVANIA 41.70% 45.29% 41.70% 34.98% 43.50% 38.34% 40.92% 17.94%
RHODE ISLAND 30.29% 41.88% 42.02% 70.45% 36.10% 56.26% 46.18% 15.96%
SOUTH CAROLINA 24.22% 22.87% 58.30% 67.71% 23.54% 67.71% 63.00% -32.29%
SOUTH DAKOTA 40.81% 63.23% 63.23% 42.60% 52.02% 52.91% 52.47% 29.60%
TENNESSEE 24.66% 125.11% 110.76% -147.53% 74.89% -18.39% 28.25% -32.29%
TEXAS 40.36% 150.22% -68.61% 50.22% 95.29% -9.19% 43.05% 13.90%
UTAH 32.74% 41.26% 41.70% 41.70% 37.00% 41.70% 39.35% 18.83%
VERMONT 24.52% 38.85% 42.04% 94.59% 31.69% 68.31% 50.00% 12.42%
VIRGINIA 24.66% 28.25% 34.98% 55.16% 26.46% 45.07% 35.76% -29.60%
WASHINGTON 41.52% 41.69% 51.52% 100.60% 41.60% 76.10% 58.85% 26.36%
WEST VIRGINIA 45.74% 45.74% 40.36% 32.74% 45.74% 36.55% 41.14% 27.80%
WISCONSIN 101.07% 22.70% 17.79% 57.45% 61.81% 37.66% 49.73% 174.38%
WYOMING 26.91% 61.43% 43.50% 48.43% 44.17% 45.96% 45.07% -21.97%
† Implicit Marginal Tax Rates (IMTR = 1− 4Disp.Icome4EarnedIncome) are calculated at each state’s minimum wage and show the percentage of the the additional
earned income that is implicitly taxed when increasing the weekly working hours according to the scenarios presented.
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two percentage points only, IMTRs for the 0 to 20-hour case range from 120.85% (North
Carolina) to 21.68% (Connecticut), and 65.69% (New Hampshire) to 27.37% (Connecticut)
for the other case. The average IMTR is 45.36% for the first scenario and 43.37% for the
latter one, with standard deviations of 22.26 and 9.29 percentage points, respectively. North
Carolina (120.85%), Iowa (95.18%), Arkansas (95.51%), Texas (95.29%), and New Jersey
(91.72%) rank among the states with the highest IMTRs for the 0 to 20-hour work shift.
On the other hand, low-income welfare-receiving individuals in Connecticut (21.68%), South
Carolina (23.54%), North Dakota (25.33%), Maine (26.45%), and Virginia (26.45%) are
subject to the lowest IMTRs when going from full-welfare dependency to part-time work
and participating in all the programs listed.
In many cases, these single mothers may be waiting for the opportunity to find employ-
ment, and may well go from being fully dependent on welfare to working full time. Under
both federal and state welfare rules, welfare recipients in New Hampshire (65.69%), Colorado
(63.67%), South Carolina (63.00%), Massachusetts (59.88%), and Washington (58.85%) will
be subject to the highest marginal tax rates as they lose much of the government aid. Con-
necticut (27.37%), North Dakota (27.46%), Tennessee (28.25%), Mississippi (31.39%), and
Arkansas (31.69%) show the lowest marginal tax rates under the same conditions.
Since low-income parents may actually slowly transition toward full-employment, Table
3.2 displays other important scenarios of labor conditions for low-income heads of households.
These households may start by finding part-time jobs first. As they try to move to full-time
employment, they are also subject to similar implicit marginal tax rates. These, however,
appear to be a lot more diverse across states, according to the simulations. For instance,
the simulations for North Carolina show that low-income single mothers trying to transition
from part-time to full-time employment will actually face incentives to do so as they would
be subject to an implicit tax rate of -44.39%. On the other hand, similar individuals in
Colorado would face IMTRs as high as 96.18%. Initial suspicion of the work disincentives
stems from employment data released by the Department of Health and Human Services
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and the Administration for Children and Families.
Table 3.2 also displays the IMTRs that such individuals will face if this transition were
even slower. Instead, mothers that need time adapt to a new working life while being able to
find proper day care for their children at a reasonable rate may increase their working hours
only marginally. This is a likely scenario given the individuals’ lack of experience and/or
training. For simplicity, I chose to increase weekly work hours by 10. By doing this, one
may analyze how labor-supply may be influenced by both earnings and choice of welfare
participation, as parents seek to slowly become self-sufficient.
Finally, going back to Holt and Romich (2007), one can think of studies that involve
all programs very informative but also limited. They find that not all low-income welfare
recipients participate in the same programs. In fact, not many participate in all programs
available to them. They note that “not all eligible households use the [all] available means-
tested benefits, so assuming full take up of means-tested programs will overstate the MTRs
facing LMI [low-and-middle-income] households.”
Data for 2006 TANF recipients suggest that, on average, approximately 80% also receives
food-stamps, and most of them participate in some kind of medical assistance program. My
dataset does not provide information on the EITC take-up rates, but Holt and Romich (2007)
find a significant percent of EITC claimants in Wisconsin being single heads of households
with two dependants. Using these statistics I recalculate the implicit marginal tax rates as-
suming that TANF recipients will also claim EITC and participate in one additional program
only (SNAP). As with my previous analysis, I do not include benefit amounts for Medicaid
expenses since they are more difficult to estimate. I call these the “Effective Marginal Tax
Rates.” Given that in many cases individuals transition slowly into the workforce, Table 3.2
displays the rate that represents the first hurdle (from 0 to 10 hours).
Indeed, one can observe an inverse relationship when comparing the work participation
rates of TANF participants against the calculated IMTRs. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show graphical
evidence of this relationship between two types of marginal tax rates and work participation
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of TANF families.
The figures show that on average, in 2006, states with the highest IMTRs experienced
lower work participation rates from individuals receiving TANF benefits. The trends ob-
served correspond to the plotting of scenarios in which individuals switch from no work to
part-time work, as well as when they barely start working (10 hours a week). These relations
are further explored in more detail in the results’ section.
4.2 Empirical Results
I use a simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) approach to examine the effect of the simulated
marginal tax rates on the employment of TANF recipients. While more complicated methods
have been acknowledged when analyzing labor-supply decisions, this analysis is concerned
with determining whether these simulated rates help explain the variation of employment
rates across states under a reformed welfare system, and not with the specific individual’s
behavior. After the 1996 reform, all states have implemented work requirements within
their welfare systems. However, not all welfare recipients comply with these ‘working’ rules.
This is in part due to the lack of monitoring, the disincentives created by the system, and
also because of some of the exceptions granted throughout as these programs become more
complex. As a result, it can be observed that no state reports a 100% work participation
rate for these welfare recipients.
Many factors influence individuals’ work choice. However, when aggregating data, one
can think of certain factors that can influence the employment rates of certain groups. As
mentioned in the section describing the data, I start the analysis with a simple model that
includes some basic controls. Since the dependent variable is work participation of welfare
recipients and it is closely related to the employment conditions and opportunities of those
who receive welfare benefits (TANF), the models are specified by control variables that
possibly affect employment of these individuals in particular.
In addition to the implicit marginal tax rates, I include the percent of female population
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Figure 3.1: Correlation Between The Work Participation of Tem-
porary Aid for Needy Families (TANF) Recipients and the Implicit
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Figure 3.2: Correlation Between The Work Participation of Tempo-
rary Aid for Needy Families (TANF) Recipients and the ‘Effective’
Implicit Marginal Tax Rate Incurred by Moving from Not Working
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in the state. Women are generally the ones in charge of child care, especially if they do not
share residence with the father of those children. Hence, it is reasonable to think that states
with higher shares of female population may experience lower work participation rates. If
most of the TANF recipients are single mothers, or children of single mothers, then one may
argue that this group of individuals could also be affected. Ideally, controlling for the share
of females that receive welfare may serve as a better control. However, according to the
data, the share of female welfare recipients in 2006 oscillated around 90%, with a standard
deviation as small as 6.63 percentage points. That leaves us with a vast majority of women
in the TANF rolls, with very small variation across states.
The percentage of the population living in rural areas attempts to control for many
of the differences among states. Not only do rural and urban states differ culturally, but
they also present differences that can clearly affect the labor markets. For the case of
low-income welfare-receiving individuals, it is not clear in which way this factor may affect
their opportunities for employment. While metropolitan areas do have bigger and more
developed labor markets that provide more opportunities, these markets may also experience
a higher supply of low-income workers, potentially leaving many unemployed. Higher labor
supply may actually reduce wages, and if total welfare benefits provide a higher income
than what individuals may earn through employment in those cities, the disincentive to seek
employment grows.
On the other hand, rural labor markets have limited opportunities. This, however, de-
pends on the type of skills needed to perform the jobs that are actually available. In any
case, even though I have no clear prior on the direction of its coefficient, Garfinkel and
Orr (1974) found that higher concentration of urban populations was associated with lower
employment rates of AFDC recipients. If this is true, and assuming that labor market op-
portunities have not changed substantially for these individuals, I expect a positive effect of
rural concentrations on the employment rates of welfare recipients.
Similarly, the effect of minorities on employment participation rates is not obvious. Yet,
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as Garfinkel and Orr (1974) noted, there has been an increase in the labor force participation
of married black women. Hence a positive coefficient for the percent of black individuals
receiving welfare may not seem surprising.
The effect of aging populations on labor force participation rates is more complicated to
predict. One could hardly think of reasons why an increase in the share of the population
of ages 65 and older would affect the labor markets for younger women. If any, one could
hypothesize that populations with older individuals could increase the availability of jobs due
to increased retirement. However, Börsch-Supan (2003) argues that an increase in the share
of older people can affect future tax rates and contribution schemes. Thus, it is possible that
younger forward thinking individuals may be discouraged by a growing gap between gross
and net earnings, reducing the willingness to participate in the labor force. To a certain
extent, this additional factor may further discourage young welfare recipients from seeking
remunerated employment.
Finally, the state unemployment rate should be a good proxy for the employment op-
portunities for these individuals. In order to avoid endogeneity I include the lag of the
unemployment rate and expect to find a negative effect on the labor outcomes for the group
analyzed in this study. In summary, the OLS equation to be estimated is given by
TANFWP = α + IMTR0−to−40hours + β1PctFemale+ β2PctRural+ (3.1)
β3PctBlack + β4PctElderly + β5UnplRatet−1 + ε
where TANFWP is the work participation of TANF recipients as defined by the Department
of of Health and Human Services. The estimated results from equation 3.1 are reported
on Table 3.4. The estimation uses robust standard errors in order to take care of possible
bias created by the presence of outliers. Table 3.4 shows results for three different models.
The first column uses the simulated marginal tax rates when welfare recipients jump from
complete welfare dependency to full-time employment. While the coefficients of the control
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variables have the expected signs, not all are statistically significant.
On the other hand, the implicit marginal tax rate does not reflect the negative correlation
displayed above. In fact, the results suggest that after controlling for other demographics,
the implicit marginal tax rate does not explain any of the variation among states’ work
participation rates of welfare recipients. Indeed, it shows a positive and statistically not
significant effect, contradicting the disincentive hypothesis. An important fact to highlight
here is that in many cases, unless forced by strict rules, the likelihood of welfare recipients
switching to full-time employment at once is very slim. Given the widely defined working
requirements in each state, the importance of child care, and the availability of employment
it is more likely that these welfare beneficiaries seek for part-time employment first.
Column 2 of Table 3.4 shows results when using simulated IMTRs for the 0 to 20 hours
per week scenario instead. The signs, magnitudes, and statistical significance for the other
control variables are comparable to those found in the first column. With the exception of the
coefficient on the share of female population, the parameter coefficients remain statistically
significant. Yet, the coefficient on the implicit marginal tax rate still shows no statistical
significance. Note that it does have the expected sign. In other words, on average and after
controlling for other demographics, one could expect lower work participation in states where
jumping from welfare dependency to part-time work yields high implicit marginal tax rates.
But work requirements for these welfare recipients differ by state and not always refer
to working for earned wages. In many cases individuals may combine participation in job
training programs with some kind of remunerated work. If there is an opportunity to work
less, comply with the state’s rules and receive benefits, it makes sense that mothers choose
the least amount of paid hours. Moreover, this is reasonable when benefits depend on the
family’s earned income and not the hours worked, and also if the implicit marginal tax rate
from working 20 hours (part-time) is higher than the rate incurred when working only 10
or 15 hours a week. Indeed, the average marginal tax rate for the 0 to 10 hour scenario is
32.95%, compared to 45.35% for the 0 to 20 hour case. Additionally, such scenario may be of
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Table 3.4: OLS Results for the Impact of Implicit Marginal Tax Rates
on Work Participation of TANF Families
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variable (0 to 40 Hrs.) (0 to 20 Hrs.) (0 to 10 Hrs.)
IMTR (0 to 40 Hours ) 0.022
(0.212)†
IMTR (0 to 20 Hours) -0.067
(0.085)
IMTR (0 to 10 Hours) -0.250*
(0.139)
Percent Female -4.522 -4.829 -5.370*
(2.729) (2.894) (2.815)
Percent Rural 0.331** 0.340** 0.327**
(0.139) (0.140) (0.136)
Percent Black 0.217*** 0.233*** 0.230***
(0.079) (0.080) (0.079)
Percent Elderly -0.844*** -0.909*** -0.922***
(0.240) (0.236) (0.212)
Lag of Unemployment Rate -0.400* -3.762* -0.372*
(2.234) (2.190) (2.176)
R2 0.3180 0.3256 0.3587
No. of Observations 48
§ Statistical significance is reported at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
† All models show results with robust standard errors in parenthesis
special interest since individuals with low skills may have to accept short work shifts before
they can prove employers of their true capabilities.
Thus, the third column of Table 3.4 displays the OLS results using the IMTRs for the 0
to 10 hour per week switch. Note that the coefficient on the IMTRs is inversely related to the
work participation rates and it is statistically significant at the 10% level. Compared to the
results obtained for the other two scenarios, this result may reaffirm the importance of this
marginal tax rates and the work requirements set by each state. Strict work requirements
may prove important to the extent that pushing individuals to work at least 20 or 30 hours a
week could avoid the disincentives observed in the 0-to-10 hour transition case. Yet, if these
requirements are not heavily enforced, and welfare recipients are constrained to a certain
amount of hours a week due to their lack of connections and job training, the disincentives
may remain, as it is shown by the results.
Also note that the coefficient on female percentage becomes statistically significant. Ad-
ditionally, this model does a better job in explaining the variation in TANF employment
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rates as evidenced by the increase in the R2. Given the wide variation among states’ implicit
marginal tax rates, compared to other variables such as unemployment rate, percent female,
and percent of the population over the age of 65, this results are better interpreted in terms
of changes in standard deviations. For the case of the implicit marginal tax rate for the 0 to
10-hour change in work behavior one standard deviation equals approximately 13 percentage
points.
The results show that the implicit marginal tax rates created from multiple program
participation do have a negative impact on the working choices of welfare participants. In
order to compare and standardize the results on Table 3.4, one can multiply the parameter
estimates by their standard deviations. Holding all other variables constant, a standard-
deviation increase in these marginal tax rates lowers the work participation rates of TANF
recipients by 0.208 standard deviations. This is no small effect if compared with the effect
of the other variables. For instance, a standard-deviation increase in unemployment rates
(often a measure of work opportunities) only lowers the work participation rates by 0.022
standard deviations. On the other hand, a standard-deviation increase in the percent of
female lowers the work participation just slightly more than the implicit marginal tax rate
(0.273 standard deviations).
To keep things in perspective, the decrease of the work participation rates can be in-
terpreted in terms of percents. On average, a 0.208 standard deviation decrease translates
into a decrease of 3.253 percentage points. Such decrease amounts to a nearly 8.50% drop
from the work participation mean (38.72%). This is especially important when these indi-
viduals take an initial step to become productive by increasing their working hours slowly.
As noted above, small changes in one program could change the resulting marginal tax rate
dramatically, sometimes by even more than 13 percentage points.
For simplicity, let us look at the case of South Carolina and Maryland. Their 0-to-10
IMTR differs by exactly 13 percentage points. While program guarantees among states
vary, among other things, depending on the costs of living, changes in the benefit structures
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will cause the dramatic change in IMTR. Assuming that welfare recipients participate in
all of the programs included in Table 3.2, South Carolina does not reduce TANF benefits
when individuals transition from no work to 10 hour work weeks. On the other hand, Food
Stamps (SNAP) benefits are reduced by 16.26%. Maryland reduces TANF benefits by as
much as 33.19% and SNAP benefits by as little as 5.52%. These differences, added to changes
occurring in other programs create an IMTR of 37.21% for Maryland and 24.21% for South
Carolina. As a result, one observes that the work participation rate in Maryland is in fact
10% higher than that of South Carolina (close to the estimated 8.50%).
Hence, even when welfare recipients do not have complete knowledge on how tax rates
and benefit reductions interact, on average they perceive the decrease of disposable income,
altering their working behavior. Yet, one must be careful when looking at labor supply
outcomes. The implicit marginal tax rates used thus far have been simulated under a set of
assumptions that may not necessarily apply to everyone. Moreover, it is widely argued that
the choice of work participation, especially for this group, may depend on more factors than
those included in the model above. Consequently, a more detailed analysis is presented as a
robustness check in the following section.
4.3 ‘Effective’ Tax Rates
Rightfully, policy makers could question the validity of these initial results by arguing that
the assumption that most, if not all, TANF families also participate in every other welfare
program at the same time is optimistic at best. To test the validity of the result, I use the
“effective” marginal tax rates described above, including only the programs that are most
widely used. This adds on evidence that the negative effects of the most popular programs
may still offset the positive effects of programs such as the EITC in the provision of work
incentives to LMI households.
The first column of Table 3.5 displays the OLS results when the effective marginal tax
rate is used. Although the magnitude of the coefficient is smaller, the negative relation
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persists and is statistically significant. These initial results would suggest that an overesti-
mation of IMTRs, as discussed previously, could lead to overestimating their impact on work
participation. However, when interpreting the results in terms of a one-standard-deviation
change, I find that a standard deviation increase in these rates also translates into a decrease
in work participation rates by 0.209 standard deviations. In other words, these results are
comparable even when the distribution of the two sets of IMTRs is different.
Yet, a potential problem arises when each state defines work participation. Temporary
Aid for Needy Families establishes rules and regulations with regards to working require-
ments. However, these rules are implemented independently by each state. In each state,
some recipients can be exempt, disregarded, deemed engaged, or required to work. Those
required to work can be classified by the type of work activity performed. Some participate
in work preparation programs, some in job search and job training programs, unsubsidized
employment, and other work activities. Some may even try to meet the hour requirement
by combining those activities.
To the best of my knowledge, these administrative data is compiled by the DHHS to
reflect the true work participation rates and allow comparisons across states. Yet, in order
to provide confidence on the results, I use a similar measure of work participation rates
based on the percent of households with earnings. Column 2 on Table 3.5 reports the
results obtained when the percent of TANF families with earnings during 2006 is used as the
dependent variable. Again, the effective IMTRs have a negative and statistically significant
impact on the dependent variable. These results ought to be interpreted carefully. The data
do not specify whether these are taxable earnings from employment or from other sources,
in which case the IMTRs simulated here should have no effect. Nonetheless, it is important
to show that the relationship seems to hold, partly due to the fact that for some of the
individuals these earnings come from work.
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Table 3.5: OLS Results for the Impact of Implicit Marginal Tax Rates
on the Percent of TANF Families Working
Variable On TANF Work On Percent of TANF
Participation Families with Earnings†
‘Effective’ IMTR (0 to 10 Hours) -0.105* -0.058*
(0.058)‡ (0.030)
Percent Female -4.869* 2.391
(2.719) (1.914)
Percent Rural 0.321** 0.003
(0.130) (0.075)
Percent Black 0.203** 0.013
(0.075) (0.065)
Percent Elderly -0.945*** -0.362**
(0.201) (0.144)
Lag of Unemployment Rate -3.839* -1.121
(2.135) (1.962)
R2 0.3669 0.1169
No. of Observations 48
§ Statistical significance is reported at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
Column heading is the dependent variable.
† Account for some kind of earnings received by the family at some point in 2006.
Data limitations does not permit to identify earnings from single or married par-
ents.
‡ Both models show results with robust standard errors in parenthesis
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4.4 Robustness Checks
Labor choices are determined by a variety of factors. Like individual work decisions, the
employment rates in regions depend on more factors than only those specified in the model.
Thus, I compare the results obtained for the IMTRs above with those from a more complete
model that uses some of the same variables used by Garfinkel and Orr (1974). Even though
the work requirements changed when TANF was implemented, the characteristics of a state
continue to explain a big part of the labor outcomes observed in each state. For this reason,
this study attempts to capture program rules and philosophies through the IMTRs, and uses
demographic variables to account for the other sources of variation of work participation
rates. Consequently, it is reasonable to use control variables that were used for studies prior
to the welfare reform, given that reform changes will be captured by the marginal tax rates.
Adding to the variables above, I include the percent of TANF recipients with 9 years of
education or less. For TANF parents, like for any other person, lower levels of education
should yield less opportunities for work and monetary reward, expecting a negative sign on
its coefficient.
The model also includes a logarithmic transformation of the maximum level of TANF
benefits for each state, the population density, the percent of TANF families with kids under
the age of 6, and the employment opportunities in the surrounding areas. Presumably, higher
TANF benefits will discourage employment. On the other hand, dense states may also have
tighter labor markets, frustrating the desires of TANF recipients to look for remunerated
work. Children under 6 years of age can be seen as an impediment to leave the house and
work. This age group requires more intense and specialized child care that can be very
expensive. Thus, I would expect a negative sign for all three coefficients.
Finally, when analyzing labor opportunities and labor markets it is important to ac-
count for the fact that these markets often cross state borders. It is well known that many
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) in the United States include counties from different
states. Hence, some of the work participation decisions may not only depend on the job
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opportunities but also on those opportunities across the state borders. As such, I draw from
the spatial econometrics literature and construct a weight (W) matrix that accounts for
neighboring characteristics by looking at each state’s immediate neighbors. This is a 48×48
matrix of zeros and ones. A value of one is given to the element wij if state i is a neighbor
of state j and zero otherwise. Since a state cannot be a neighbor of itself, zeros are assigned
to the main diagonal.
This matrix is row-normalized and multiplied by the lag of the unemployment rates.
This returns a vector with states’ neighbors’ average unemployment rate. If unemployment
rates are spatially correlated, a state’s unemployment rate may increase if its neighbors’ rates
increase. Hence, I expect to observe a negative correlation between neighbors’ unemployment
rates and work participation.
Table 3.6 shows the results for the two different model specifications (IMTR vs. Effective
IMTR). Both columns follow the original model using the best measure of work participation
available in the dataset. In both specifications, even when including the additional controls,
the coefficients of the initial marginal tax rate (from 0 to 10 hours per week) have the
same sign and have similar magnitudes. Although the IMTR is not statistically significant
under the traditional standards, the difference is minimal. In fact, it has a p-value of 0.110
making it almost significant at the 10% level. The original variable coefficients conserve the
signs although some lose statistic significance. Interestingly, only coefficients on population
density and neighbors’ unemployment rate have the expected sign.
The signs on low-educated parents and TANF guarantees show positive and significant
effects. These puzzling results are counterintuitive and hard to explain. In one hand, it may
be possible that states with higher TANF benefits have stricter rules on work requirements
and compliance. Yet, there is no sufficient evidence to support this hypothesis since the data
has no information on monitoring.11 On the other hand, states with higher percent of the
welfare recipients with low levels of education may have more low-skilled jobs available, being
11See Moffitt (2006) for the importance of screening and monitoring for the implementation of work
requirements.
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Table 3.6: OLS Results for the Impact of Implicit Marginal Tax Rates
on the Percent of TANF Families Working
On Work Participation
Variable of TANF Recipients
IMTR (0 to 10 Hours) -0.223
(0.136)
‘Effective’ IMTR (0 to 10 Hours) -0.101*
(0.059)
Percent Female -3.282 -3.094
(3.053) (2.971)
Percent Rural 0.206 0.208
(0.158) (0.152)
Percent Black 0.338*** 0.318***
(0.096) (0.094)
Percent of Elderly -0.774*** -0.817***
(0.254) (0.258)
Lag of Unemployment Rate -1.886 -1.853
(2.299) (2.295)
Percent With Low Education‡ 1.114** 1.104**
(0.510) (0.511)
TANF Guarantee 8.654* 9.147**
(4.276) (4.150)
Population Density -0.016* -0.014
(0.008) (0.009)
Percent With Kids under 6 0.750 0.786
(0.488) (0.487)
Neighbors’ Unemployment Rates -7.555 -7.750
(4.816) (4.689)
R2 0.4729 0.4859
No. of Observations 48
§ Statistical significance is reported at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
‡ Percent of adult TAMF recipients with 9 years of education or less.
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able to accommodate these individuals more easily. Again, these hypotheses are hard to prove
given the nature of this analysis, leaving some room for future research.12 The labor market
conditions in neighboring states show the expected sign but are not statistically significant.13
The models using percent of families with earnings including all additional control vari-
ables show very similar results but suffer from the same caveats mentioned in the previous
section.14
5 Conclusion
Marginal tax rates, like any other tax rate, act as mechanisms that can potentially discourage
individuals to work additional time in order to earn some additional income. However,
marginal taxes are not limited to those stipulated by the tax codes, especially for low-and-
middle income families who are subject to some exemptions and may believe that none of
their income is being taxed. In fact, when these families participate in welfare and some
other government social programs they may be subject to very high tax rates- depending
on which and how many programs they participate in- as their earnings from work increase
and their benefits decrease.
Since they are not stipulated in any tax code or schedule, these tax rates are “implicitly”
imposed on low-income individuals. As individuals start earning wages, their benefits start
being phased out and a great part of what was disposable income before gets taxed away. In
other words, the spendable income decreases, affecting the real purchasing power of welfare
recipients.
Consequently, more and more welfare recipients may be discouraged from looking to add
12One argument may be that the model also needs to control for the impact of work requirements set by
TANF. This vary across states and are not captured by the IMTR. However, this variation is small in the
sense that the work hour requirement is usually 20, 30, or 35 hours per week. I run the model including a
dummy variable describing strict requirements if states require more than 30 hours per week after accounting
for education allowance, and lose if less. The results do not change and the p-value for IMTRs remains just
slightly above 0.10. These results are available from the author upon request.
13An additional check was pursued correcting for possible spatial dependence in the error term and results
suggest that there is no statistical evidence of such dependence.
14Again, these results are available from the author upon request.
75
more working hours to their week, decreasing their overall labor force participation rate.
This situation worsens as individuals participate in more benefit programs. Current data
suggests that individuals participate in 2 or 3 of the programs available (TANF, SNAP,
and Medicaid). In many states this does not only generate high implicit marginal tax rates
but also creates a disincentive to work. This problem can be exacerbated if individuals
participate in other programs as well. If the welfare participation of these families does not
change, not all states will experience huge implicit tax rates. Figure 3.2 showed that in some
states some of the implicit marginal tax rates are negative. Nonetheless, participating in
more programs will give a totally different picture.
This, of course, is without counting the implications of losing the benefits of Medicaid,
which is not counted for this calculation, but it is highly regarded by this group of individu-
als. Future analysis and research can include the implementation of the health care reform
recently signed in to law in 2010.
At the state level, the results have important implications given the effect of this implicit
taxation on the labor force participation rates of welfare beneficiaries. I have shown that even
after the welfare reform, some states continue providing these individuals with disincentives
to find work. Moreover, the results show that under weak monitoring systems, as welfare
recipients start their transition into the labor market, the most influential IMTRs are the
ones that result from increasing the working hours from 0 to 10 per week. However, according
to the data stricter work requirements may serve as a mechanism to avoid such disincentives.
On average, states with higher implicit marginal tax rates have lower work participation
rates from welfare recipients, even when accounting for labor opportunities in neighboring
jurisdictions. Furthermore, these disincentives, on average, appear to change work partic-
ipation rates by as much as 8.50%, which is no small effect. The disincentives can drive
welfare recipients away from self-sufficiency and instead make them depend on welfare for
as long as they are allowed. As a consequence, states may be losing potential workers while
also having to keep supporting them financially.
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The results presented here use simulated marginal tax rates and aggregated data in
order to show the effect of state program rules on the states’ effort to motivate more LMI
individuals to work. A more detailed analysis of labor supply decisions of welfare recipients
require individual-level data including program participation, benefit amounts, family living
expenses such as rent, transportation, and net child care expenditures, as well as time under
welfare since this may constitute an important determinant of labor supply. This provides
an avenue for future research that can give a better understanding on how the individual
welfare recipients- not just an aggregated group- behave when facing such disincentives. This




Yardstick Competition, Politics, and
The 1996 U.S. Welfare Reform
1 Introduction
In 1996, the United States passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Recon-
ciliation Act (PRWORA) which, among other things, gave states freedom to regulate public
welfare spending individually under a new set of federal guidelines. This act allowed states to
set benefit levels and time limits at their own discretion. It has been found that even before
the 1996’s reform, when state benefit levels were strictly determined by federal regulations
with relatively little influence from state governments, states’ spending policies appeared
to be influenced by the spending policies of their neighboring states (Baicker, 2005b; Case,
Rosen and Hines Jr., 1993).1 These results are often interpreted as measuring government
competition. Accordingly, increased state autonomy in setting welfare expenditure levels
should result in states exhibiting a greater degree of spatial dependence. However, spending
policy outcomes are subject to political processes and the consensus of policymakers. Con-
sequently, the political structure of each state may influence the type and strength of spatial
1See Case, Rosen and Hines Jr. (1993) for a brief analysis on how different types of expenditures may
lead to different results for the spatial correlation coefficient.
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dependence among states.
This chapter uses a two-regime spatial econometric model to test for the strength of
spatial dependence between states’ welfare expenditures under several political structures. I
find that spatial dependence among state governments differs between states under politically
unified governments and those under coalition governments. In particular, I find that unified
governments do not engage in welfare spending competition while divided governments do.
Moreover, I find that the degree of spatial dependence, given the political structure of the
state, is different when analyzing the pre-and-post reform periods. Contrary to what may
be expected from increased decentralization, after the welfare reform there is less evidence
of spatial dependence (or government competition) among states. This evidence suggests
that the welfare reform not only brought administrative changes, but also fiscal changes,
especially in the way state governments interact when more of their own resources are at
stake.
In this chapter I also calculate the correct marginal effects for the control variables used in
most panel-data analyses of fiscal policy competition. These effects differ from the standard
regression interpretation of coefficient estimates. Models that contain spatial lags of the
dependent variable must account for the fact that changes to an explanatory variable in
a given region can potentially affect the dependent variable in all regions through changes
to its own dependent variable. This marginal effects account for interactions among higher
order neighbors.
Strategic interaction among governments can be explained by different theories, depend-
ing on the interaction channel assumed (preferences, constraints and expectations) (Revelli,
2005b). In the case of fiscal and yardstick competition, two different reasons may be de-
fined. An “exit” argument suggests that individuals will leave or migrate to states where
their preference for public goods is better met. A “voice” argument says that citizens will
voice their opinions through their votes, and these depend on what they observe in other
jurisdictions. Either way, politicians value those votes, leading them react to what their
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counterparts are doing in neighboring jurisdictions. Tiebout (1956), for instance, suggested
that spatial spillovers emerge as governments compete for resources by trying to attract cit-
izens based on preferences for public goods provision. Others find that re-election concerns
result in political ‘yardstick competition’ (Case, 1993; Besley and Case, 1995). If states’
spending is closely related to population mobility, this provides evidence that government
competition fits the model of sorting based on public good provision. If true, this has eco-
nomic and political implications as states may set welfare benefits based on the benefit levels
in other states, to an extent that they may end up in what is commonly called a “race to
the bottom.”2
In any case, state interdependence can be affected by the political structure of the leg-
islative and executive bodies. Under the conjecture that political leaders are often judged by
what has been done in other jurisdictions, either by the threat of re-election or migration,
different politicians may respond to neighboring states’ policies differently. State governors
that seek reelection adopt different fiscal spending strategies than those who do not, and
these strategies appear to be influenced by policies adopted in surrounding states (Besley
and Case, 1995). For the case of welfare spending, fiscal interaction and political structure
may help us understand the source of such interdependence. Democrat leaders, for instance,
may be more worried about migration since many welfare recipients tend to adopt liberal
redistributive philosophies. Having those votes becomes crucial for these leaders. On the
other hand, the voice argument can be better supported when there is no established control
of the government, and politicians will care about capturing as many votes as possible. That
could be the case when governments are divided.
Out of the fifteen states with legislative term limits, only eight have lifetime bans. The
other nine have limits on the consecutive number of years in which a legislator can serve
in a particular chamber. This does not limit an incumbent from running for election to
2See Albert and Catlin (2002) for a comprehensive analysis of state benefit levels under the hypothesis
that state competition puts downward pressure on state benefits in fear that these levels may seem relatively
generous compared to other states. They find that strategic interaction in benefit-setting does exist, but has
not intensified under the welfare reform.
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the other chamber, where the clock resets (NCSL, 2009). Loose limits in the legislature
makes it harder to determine whether running or not running for reelection matters for fiscal
policy setting, given that the majority of the political leaders who influence fiscal policy
have the a continuous chance to run for reelection. This does not mean that reelection
opportunities do not matter for fiscal policy competition, however, but it does prompt a
search for other political instances in which reelection may matter more. Similarly, under
what conditions migration can be more influential. Previous empirical work using U.S. data
on state and local government for pre-1996 reform periods has found support for both the
Tiebout and the yardstick competition hypotheses. Yet these results are worth examining for
the period marked by the reform, given that significant changes were implemented, including
the increased autonomy and responsibilities of each state government, which would lead us
to think that a race to the bottom based on migration could have gained importance.
The autonomy gained through a federal block-grant system created by the 1996 reform
is contingent on certain federal regulations. First, an individual cannot receive means-tested
cash benefits for more than 60 months during their lifetime. Further, states must (1) impose
strict work requirements for the majority of recipients, (2) increase regulation on child care
provision and (3) engage in better monitoring of child support payments. The reform also
imposes restrictions on welfare participation of illegal immigrants. Finally, no more than
fifteen percent of the grants may be used for administrative expenses. States are allowed to
set up their own benefit structures, but are subject to a lump-sum grant scheme in which
states are required to contribute most of the funds in order to receive the corresponding
grants from the federal government. Shorter time limits, maximum benefit levels, and benefit
reduction rates are all states’ responsibilities.
I combine pre-and-post-reform data on state and local public welfare expenditures with
measures of political government structures based on partisan majorities in order to deter-
mine the effect of political control on the degree of spatial dependence and state competition
before and after the welfare reform bill. Previous results use pre-reform data and may not
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fully capture the process of state competition given the federal-entitlement system of the
time. Furthermore, while some analysis has focused on the impact of political structures on
government competition for certain European countries, the channels through which local
fiscal policies interact in the United States are often different from those in Europe, as many
of the European nations have parliamentary systems. This, coupled with the enactment of
a major welfare spending reform, presents an excellent opportunity to measure the effects of
political settings before and after the reform in the United States, which to my knowledge
has not been done before.
This chapter contributes to the literature by examining alternative political determinants
of fiscal policy competition in the United States using a two-regime spatial econometric
analysis.3 I use panel data on per capita state welfare spending from 1987 to 2006, and
calculate the degree of spatial interactions among states with different political structures,
as well as the true marginal effects of the explanatory variables used in both the one-and-
two regime spatial autoregressive models of government competition. With the exception
of Case, Rosen and Hines Jr. (1993), these effects have been largely ignored by the recent
literature on political competition and have not been fully developed for models with two
regimes. The time period for this data set captures the changes created by the 1996 reform,
providing a unique opportunity to study the behavior of state governments under increased
decentralization. The two-regime model in this chapter, which differentiates between unified
and divided governments, provides evidence of political yardstick competition based on the
partisan structure of state governments. I find that unified governments do not engage in
welfare spending competition while divided governments do. These results are less evident
for after the enactment of the welfare reform bill. I also find that the degree of welfare
spending competition between states is not only sensitive to government structure, but also
3Identification of yardstick competition presents a challenge to the empirical implementation of reaction
functions. According to Revelli (2005b), reduced-form models may not be able to determine whether spatial
auto-correlation is simply due to spillovers from commonly experienced shocks, or the existence of strategic
interactions among incumbent governments. He suggests that some of the identification may be achieved
if additional constraints are imposed on these local governments- including local party competition and
ideological complexion.
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to the party that holds the majority of seats. When using migration flow matrices, the
results on the degree of spatial autocorrelation for states’ welfare spending are inconclusive,
providing little support for the “exit” argument based on migration patterns.
The remainder of the chapter is organized in 4 sections. Section 2 reviews the literature,
section 3 describes the methodology and data, and section 4 discusses the results. Section 5
concludes.
2 Background
Several studies have pointed out the importance of accounting for spatial dependence when
examining local fiscal policies.4 Tiebout (1956) and Wildasin (1988) argued that in the
long-run individuals will sort themselves out based on local provision of public goods and
tax policies. As a result, one may predict that jurisdictions will engage in fiscal competition
to attract resources. Besley and Case (1995), however, developed a model in which elected
officials compete with officials from other locales based on the assumption that voters judge
their political leaders by comparing them to the leaders from other jurisdictions. If this
were true, fiscal decisions would exhibit spatial dependence in the sense that they are partly
influenced by fiscal decisions elsewhere. Brown and Oats (1987); Borjas and Hilton (1996);
and Baicker (2005a) find that states tend to determine welfare benefit levels strategically
based on potential for interstate migration and federal grants. Political yardstick competition
then suggests that fiscal policy dependence is closely related to political processes rather than
the sorting of individuals as a result of public goods provision.
Besley and Case (1995) tested the political competition hypothesis and found that fiscal
interaction between states during 1960 to 1988 was strongly determined by the incumbent’s
opportunity of reelection. In 1993, Case, Rosen, and Hines further explored the political
yardstick competition hypothesis and found that after controlling for state and year fixed
4Federico Revelli has payed particular attention to the subject. See Revelli (2001, 2002a,b, 2003, 2005a)
for a comprehensive review of several issues in testing spatial interaction.
83
effects, per capita expenditures in the U.S. states are not only positively influenced by
per capita spending in neighboring states but also tightly related to political processes.
Additionally, they found that the degree of spatial dependence is greater when neighborliness
is defined by demographic characteristics (e.g. the percent of black population or states
with similar income levels). Baicker (2005b) found stronger support for fiscal competition
motivated by migration between states rather than political processes. Baicker (2005b) used
instrumental variables with a migration-based weight matrix to elaborate on the work of
Case, Rosen and Hines Jr. (1993) and finds that fiscal government competition is more
sensitive to measures of in-migration. Vermeir and Heyndels (2006) find evidence of political
yardstick competition among Flemish municipal tax rates. They find that incumbents tend
to be punished for raising tax rates.
State competition based on welfare benefits has been extensively studied. Previous work
finds evidence supporting the idea that states’ welfare spending is positively related to neigh-
bors’ spending. Saavedra (2000) and Wheaton (2000) found that spillovers from welfare
competitions are positive and significant. Figlio, Kolpin and Reid (1999) estimate migration-
based spatial spillovers using welfare benefits data for the U.S. states and find larger responses
to neighbors’ decreases than neighbors’ increases. Brueckner (2003) reviews some of the lit-
erature on government interaction. He points out that positive spatial autocorrelations are
not enough to determine whether state interdependence describes the sorting of resources,
or are the result of yardstick competition. He also discusses the econometric issues involved
with these types of models.5 More recently, Revelli (2008) links part of the competition
and incumbency literature to the performance of local governments. He analyzes the role of
media networks in spreading information, a key player in models of yardstick competition,
about local taxation and public service provision practice.
Elhorst and Fréret (2009) introduce a political sensitivity model to distinguish between
political-based and migration-based spillovers. They use a two-regime Spatial Durbin model
5See Brueckner (2000) and Brueckner (2003) for more in depth discussions of welfare spatial spillover
literature.
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and find that French departmental governments exhibit larger degrees of sensitiveness to
fiscal policy changes in neighboring departments when council presidents have low politi-
cal support (measured as the percentage of supporting seats). Their findings suggest that
spillovers found for public welfare expenditures in French departments are due to politi-
cal yardstick competition rather than migration flows. Solé-Ollé (2003) examines yardstick
competition under single party majority and coalition governments using tax data for Spain.
Other studies highlighting the importance of political yardstick competition in other Euro-
pean countries include Schaltegger and Kttel (2002), and Revelli (2006).
I use the methodology in Elhorst and Fréret (2009) to analyze the nature of spatial
spatial dependance for public welfare expenditures in United States. Instead of using data
on opportunity for reelection, I study political yardstick competition by conditioning states’
welfare spending on political party controls. While state spending depends on a wide variety
of factors, there is an increasing concern among researchers about issues associated with
legislative outcomes under divided and unified governments. For quite some time, both
economists and political scientists have studied the impact of political constraints policy
outcomes, including fiscal policy. Kernell (1991) argues that under a divided government
legislation becomes a product of a bargaining process that can easily delay processes of policy
change and result in political gridlock.
Niskanen (2006) argues that divided governments are not necessarily bad, given that
such gridlock will act as a constraint on government growth, as legislatures struggle to
agree on fiscal and budgetary issues. Others, however, do not find sufficient evidence of
gridlock under divided governments (Meyhew, 1991; Jones, 1995). Yet, it has been found
that divided governments do affect the legislative process (Edwards, Barrett and Peake,
1997), so that it should be included in models of political competition. The two-regime
model helps in differentiating between the degrees of spatial autocorrelation for unified and
divided governments.
Fiscal outcomes are also affected by party controls. Alt and Lowry (1994) found that
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combinations of party and institutional controls help explain the persistence of state-level
budget deficits and other fiscal problems. Additionally, it has been found that left-wing
majority parties spend a little more than their counterparts, especially when the composition
of the ruling party remains unchanged over a long time period (Blais, Blake and Dion,
1993). Finally, Geys and Vermeir (2008) relate partisan importance to models of yardstick
competition by creating a theoretical model in which politicians’ response to policies in
neighboring jurisdiction are subject to the political party affiliation of each jurisdiction’s
leader. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that political parties also influence the level
or degree of state spending competition.
3 Data and Methodology
3.1 Empirical Methodology
This analysis uses spatial econometric techniques to measure how state governments respond
to changes in neighboring states’ spending. The dependent variable is taken to be linearly
correlated to its spatial lag and other controls. Through maximum likelihood estimation, I
analyze the political competition among states’ total welfare spending in the United States.6
Among other programs, total welfare spending includes several assistance programs such
as housing, foodstamps, Women and Infant Care (WIC), and Temporary Aid for Needy
Families (TANF). This study differs from previous work in that it uses data for the years
before and after the 1996 Welfare Reform. Even though states are still constrained by some
federal regulations, the welfare reform of 1996 gave states the flexibility to manage their
programs independently. This allows me to examine government spending behavior across
state governments in the absence of strict federal influence.
In addition to using data to compare the pre-and-post-reform periods, I extend the
6see Baicker (2001, 2005b) for an instrumental variable approach also used to solve possible endogeneity.
ML is an alternative method to solve it.
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traditional spatial regression used by others to a two-regime model in which the degree of
interaction among states depends on the political structure of the state government. Similar
to the study by Elhorst and Fréret (2009) for political yardstick competition in France, I
use a conditional spatial autocorrelation model to test whether political competition in the
United States depends on the political organization of state governments at any given year.
Following LeSage and Pace (2009), I also calculate the true marginal effects estimates for
the set of controls specified in the model. LeSage and Pace (2009) point out that in the
presence of spatial dependence, the coefficients of the independent variables are not the
true marginal effects. These must be calculated separately. This analysis begins with the
original one-regime spatial autocorrelation model as a benchmark, which I then compare to
the two-regime specification. Finally, I compare the marginal effect estimates for the two
models.
One-regime Specification
The estimation follows the methodology used in some of the previous literature, estimating
the usual spatial autocorrelation model with a geographical weight matrix of the 48 lower
states that accounts for the influence of contiguous neighboring states only. Controlling for












wijxjtrθr + α + ui + γt + εit (4.1)
where i = 1...N (N = 48), t is a time index where t = 1...T , xitr is one of k independent
variables, and ε represents the idiosyncratic term (ε v MVN (0,σ2In)). The term
∑N
i=1wijyjt
is the spatial lag of the dependent variable, and it is a linear combination of the values of
y that correspond to the neighbors of region i. For our purpose, W has been constructed
as an N × N row-normalized spatial weight matrix in which only a region’s immediate
neighbors carry a weight and each neighbor is equally weighted. Finally, note that equation
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(4.1) above describes a Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) that includes spatially-lagged control
variables and spatial (ui) and time (γt) fixed effects.
7 LeSage and Pace (2009) justify the use
of SDM models, with spatially lagged control variables, by arguing that omitted variables in
a spatial autoregressive process may be spatially correlated, as well as with the covariates in
the model. If this is true, results from the autoregressive process will be biased.8
Additionally, as mentioned by Elhorst and Fréret (2009), the inclusion of these spatially
weighted control variables that account for the omission of variables, space fixed effects
that control for unobserved group characteristics, and time-fixed effects that can be seen
as a replacement for spatial error correlation, we can make sure that the model does not
suffer from the identification problem pointed by Manski (1993). Likelihood ratio tests favor
the use of the SDM model over the Spatial Autoregressive Model (SAR) for these data.9
Spatial and time-period fixed effects control for place-and-time-specific variations resulting
from additional variable omission not captured in traditional cross-sectional work. Ignoring
these effects in panel-data analysis may also lead to biased estimates (Baltagi, 2005; Elhorst
and Fréret, 2009).10 Likelihood ratio tests for this specific data set support the use of the
SDM model and the inclusion of two-way fixed effects. An LR test with a value of 101.18
(p-value<0.001) reject the use of the SAR model in favor of the SDM model, while an LR
of 875.86 (p-value<0.001) rejects the use of SDM model without the fixed effects. Given the
ongoing discussion about the pros and cons of including spatial fixed effects, I follow Elhorst
and Fréret (2009) and test for the alternative of a random effects model using both Hausman
and LR tests. Both tests suggest the use of the fixed effects model.11
7See Elhorst (2003) for an explanation of spatial panel-data estimations and the treatment of the intercepts
under Maximum Likelihood estimation
8See LeSage and Pace (2009) pages 29 and 30, and 157-163. Introduction to Spatial Econometrics.
9SAR does not include the spatial lags of the control variables. Only the spatially-lagged dependent
variable.
10Previous literature, including Baicker (2005b), Case, Rosen and Hines Jr. (1993), and Elhorst and Fréret
(2009), provide justification for time and space fixed effects.
11The LR test has a value of 622.93 with 1 degree of freedom and p-value<0.001. The Hausman test yields
a value of -158.19, 19 degrees of freedom, and p-value<0.001. Partridge (2005) points out that Hausman
test results should be interpreted with caution, then in this case it is used to reinforce the results of the LR
test.
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Using the SDM model as the true model, we can use matrix notation to re-write equation
(4.1) in such a way that we account for all T cross-sections of N observations as follows
Y = WTY ρ+Xβ +WTXθ + U + Γ + ε (4.2)
where Y = (y′1, ..., y
′
T )
′, yt = (y1t, ..., yNt)
′ is the N × 1 vector of observations for the tth time
period, X = (x′1, ..., x
′
T )
′ so that xt denotes the N × k matrix of non-stochastic regressors at
time t, and WT = IT ⊗W . U and Γ are vectors of space and time fixed effects respectively.
As noted, W is a N ×N contiguity matrix that is constant over time. Hence, we can write
the data generating process as
Y = (INT − ρWT )−1(Xβ +WXθ + U + Γ + ε) (4.3)
where ρ measures the degree of spatial dependence in the dependent variable (state’s welfare
expenditure) and ε ∼ MVN(0, σ2IN). We can further simplify the DGP in (4.3) such that
Y = P−1[α +Xβ +WTXθ + U + Γ + ε] (4.4)
where P is an NT ×NT matrix with (IN − ρW ) in the main diagonal. Assuming that there
is no intertemporal dependence, the matrix of marginal effects for changes in the Xr variable
at time t is given by (IN − ρW )−1(INβr + Wθr).12 The diagonal elements of this matrix
are the effects on region i from changing Xr on that same region at time t (and these are
the same for all t’s). In the presence of spatial dependence, these “own-partial derivatives”
account for higher-order neighbor effects (LeSage and Pace, 2009). This follows from the fact
that (IN − ρW )−1 = (IN + ρW + ρ2W 2 + ρ3W 3 + ρ4W 4 + ...+ ρ∞W∞), which tells us that in
the model above the expected value of each yit will depend on the mean values of the right
hand side variables plus a linear combination of values of neighboring regions scaled by ρ.
12See Appendix for full derivation.
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The infinite series expansion shows the cumulative effects. In other words, how if a region is
influenced by its neighbors, and those neighbors are also influenced by their neighbors, then
every region is also influenced by higher-order neighbors. Similarly, the off-diagonals of this
matrix represent cross-partial derivatives of yi with respect to changes in the xr variable in
region j at time t.
While this matrix is very informative for specific analysis, it complicates the task of in-
terpreting the parameter estimates. I follow LeSage and Pace (2009) and calculate compre-
hensive measures of these effects by averaging them to provide scalar measures. The ‘direct’
effects are defined as the average of the diagonal elements of (IN − ρW )−1(INβr + Wθr).13
The ‘total’ effects are obtained by averaging the sum of the rows, and the ‘indirect’ effects
are given by the difference between the ‘total’ and ‘direct’ effects. The parameters ρ̂, β̂,
and θ̂ for this panel analysis are estimated via maximum likelihood as described by Elhorst
(2003).
Two-regime Specification
The two-regime estimation divides the spatial correlation coefficients into two components.
One for states that have unified governments and one for states with divided governments.
As mentioned previously, this extends the single-regime model above by using the model
described by Elhorst and Fréret (2009) and is applied to the political state government
structure in the United States. The model in matrix notation is
Yt = ρ1DtWYt + ρ2(IN −Dt)WYt +Xtβ +WXtθ + U + Γ + ε (4.5)
for the SDM specification, and
Yt = ρ1DtWYt + ρ2(IN −Dt)WYt +Xtβ + U + Γ + ε (4.6)
13Although not reported, the spatial and time fixed effects are also influenced by the degree of spatial
autocorrelation ρ.
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for the SAR specification. In this case Dt represents the N×N matrix with diagonal elements
equal to the values corresponding to each state’s regime status. For instance, if at a given
year (t) Alabama has a unified government, the element that corresponds to the first row
and first column of Dt will take the value of 1 and the value 0 if its government is divided.
I define divided and unified governments in the following section. Thus, ρ1 measures the
impact of neighbors for those states that have a unified government, while ρ2 does it for
those with a divided government for a given time period. Note that Dt varies over time
as a state government may be unified one year but divided in the next, depending on the
political cycle. Likelihood ratio tests results of 78.96 (9 degrees of freedom and p-value<
0.001) suggest that for the two-regime specification the SDM model is also preferred to the
SAR model, after controlling for all the explanatory variables commonly used in the most
of the previous literature. Further LR tests (1,062.67 with 68 dof and p-value<0.001) reject
the use of the SDM model with out controls for space and time-specific effects.
Let W t1 = DtW and W
t
2 = (IN − Dt)W so that the data generating process (DGP) of





2Yt +Xtβ +WXtθ + U + Γ + ε
= (IN − ρ1W t1 − ρ2W t2)−1(Xtβ +WXtθ + U + Γ + ε) (4.7)
Again, X is an NT × R matrix of control variables, U and Γ are matrices of spatial and
time fixed effects, and ε is the vector of idiosyncratic components. Similar to the model with
one spatial correlation coefficient, this model is also estimated through maximum likelihood
using spatial and time-period fixed effects. Assuming that the errors are normally distributed
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t=1 ln|IN − ρ1DtW − ρ2(IN −DtW )| represents the Jacobian matrix of the trans-
formation from ε to y, and the terms accompanied with a star denote the demeaned transfor-
mation of those variables (Baltagi, 2005). Using the first-order conditions from the untrans-
formed likelihood function allows us to solve for α, ui, and γt, and use these solutions back
into the log-likelihood function to then find the concentrated log-likelihood function above
to estimate β, ρ1, ρ2, θ, and σ2.
14 The total, direct, and indirect effects for this model are
found by taking the partial derivatives of the reduced model in equation (4.7). This time,
however, because we have two regimes and both W t1 and W
t
2 vary with respect to the specific
regime at time t, the elements of the main diagonal of P will differ from time to time.15 This
implies that, contrary to the one-regime case, partial derivatives are not identical for each
time period even if the assumption of constant parameters is kept.
Let Str(W ) = (IN − ρ1W t1 − ρ2W t2)−1(INβr +Wθr) be the matrix of marginal effects from
changes in variable Xr at time t derived from the two-regime model specification.
16 Just as
before, I calculate comprehensive measures of the marginal-effect estimates (direct, indirect,
total) by using estimated parameters of β, θ, ρ1, and ρ2 from the maximum likelihood
estimation. Once again, these parameters are assumed to be constant through time. Since
the averages for the total, direct, and indirect effects are scalar measures computed for each
point in time, I find a more comprehensive measure by averaging those scalars over all time
14See Elhorst (2003) and Elhorst and Fréret (2009) for a complete mathematical solution of the concen-
trated maximum likelihood estimation.
15See Appendix for full derivation.
16An alternative model could further develop a more elaborate SDM model in which the spatial lags of
the independent variables also depend on the two different regimes. I am not concerned with the estimation
of such model but it it may be an avenue for future research.
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periods.
Using the calculation of marginal effects above, we get Ŝtr(W ) = (IN−ρ̂1W t1−ρ̂2W t2)−1(IN β̂r+
Wθ̂r) where the parameter estimates are obtained from the estimation of the concentrated
log-likelihood. Additionally, let Ŝtr(W )direct be a scalar obtained from averaging the diag-
onal elements of the N × N matrix Ŝtr(W ), Ŝtr(W )total be the sum of the rows in Ŝtr(W )
averaged over the number of regions in each cross-section, and Ŝtr(W )indirect be a scalar de-
fined by the difference between the total and direct effect estimates for changes in variable
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I compute the comprehensive measures of the total and indirect effects using the same
methodology. It is important to note that the reported estimates for such effects are pro-
duced after simulating the parameters through the maximum likelihood multivariate normal
parameter distribution and the analytical Hessian approach described by LeSage and Pace
(2009) using the information matrix. Means (averages), standard deviations, and t-statistics
are constructed from 1,000 simulated draws.
3.2 Data Description
In my analysis I use longitudinal data from the Survey of Government Finances (SGF) for
total public welfare spending during the 1987 through 2006 period. These data are collected
for all of the lower 48 states in the United States and do not include the District of Columbia.
The SGF defines public welfare spending as,
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“[The] support of and assistance to needy persons contingent upon their need.
Excludes pensions to former employees and other benefits not contingent on need.
Expenditures under this heading include: Cash assistance paid directly to needy
persons under the categorical programs (Old Age Assistance, Temporary Assis-
tance for Needy Families (TANF)) and under any other welfare programs; Vendor
payments made directly to private purveyors for medical care, burials, and other
commodities and services provided under welfare programs; and provision and
operation by the government of welfare institutions. Other public welfare includes
payments to other governments for welfare purposes, amounts for administration,
support of private welfare agencies, and other public welfare services. Health and
hospital services provided directly by the government through its own hospitals
and health agencies, and any payments to other governments for such purposes
are classed under those functional headings rather than here” (SGF, 2009).
Following the previous literature, the control variables include federal grants, tax revenues,
population density, percent female population, percent of population that is at least 65 years
of age, percent black, per capita income, unemployment rate, and a political dummy variable
that takes the value of 1 if the governor is Democrat and 0 otherwise.17
Federal grants and tax revenues are also obtained from the Survey of Government Fi-
nances. Data on income come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and represents
the income per capita net of all transfer payments in an attempt to get rid of potential
endogeneity problems. Other demographic variables come from the United States Census
estimates. Unemployment rates are annual lags in order to correct for endogeneity and
simultaneity, and represent seasonally adjusted average rates obtained from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS). Data on the governors’ party come from Dubin (2007). All monetary
variables are expressed in natural logs of real (2006=100) per capita dollars.
To classify whether a state government is unified or divided, I use data on legislators’
party affiliation from Dubin (2007). State governments are composed of two branches, the
executive and the legislative. States in which one single party holds a majority of each of
17In order to avoid multicollinearity, percent of female only includes the number of women between the
ages of 20 and 64. Poor women outside this range are less likely to receive TANF, and may substitute it for
other types of welfare. While this does not take care of the problem entirely, given that within that group
there may be African-Americans counted as a separate control, or the fact that unemployment rates may
be higher in areas with great concentrations of minority groups, tests suggest that the pair-wise correlation
between this variables is not very strong. Alternative model specifications dropping some of these variables
do not change the quality of the results.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics: Political Yardstick Competition in U.S. Welfare Spending
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Public Welfare $803.20 308.43 235 2,018
Federal Grants $1,077.30 389.17 414 3,816
Tax Revenues $1,998.90 456.13 828 4,137
State Per Capita Income $26,643.50 5,053.70 15,934 46,898
Population Density 178.79 244.45 4.67 1,165
Percent Female (age 20-64) 29.59 1.07 25.72 31.69
Percent Black 10.53 9.85 0 40.90
Percent age 65 and over 12.92 3.01 8.19 43.01
Percent Unemployed (Lagged) 5.30 1.54 2.24 12.43
Percent Democrat Governor 45.3
Political Characteristics
Percent Unified Government 42.2 Percent Divided Government 57.8
Unified Republican (%) 49.1 Divided Republican Majority (%) 17.1
Unified Democrat (%) 50.9 Divided Democrat Majority (%) 82.9
Percent Unified Legislature 74.9 Percent Divided Legislature 25.1
With Republican Majority (%) 41.0 With Republican Majority (%) 41.5
With Democrat Majority (%) 59.0 With Democrat Majority (%) 58.5
Percent Simple Republican Majority 43.8 Percent Simple Democrat Majority 56.2
Number of years: 20 (1987-2006)
Number of observations: 960
All monetary values are adjusted for inflation (2006=100), in per capita terms.
the two houses of the legislature and the governorship office are considered to be unified.
When a party controls only two of the three bodies of government (upper chamber, lower
chamber, and Governorship), that state is considered to have a divided government.18 Under
a different specification of political regimes, I relax the conditions on the governorship, and
look at the effects of unified versus divided legislatures. Presumably, this provides an idea
about the strength and power of the governors. Table 4.1 describes the data. The first
part of the table displays the summary statistics for all independent variables before any
logarithmic transformations. The first three rows are the per capita averages in real terms,
and population density is obtained by averaging the number of persons per square mile in
each state.
The lower part of the table provides information about the composition of the political
variables analyzed. The sample period (1987-2006) includes data covering more than four
political cycles, allowing for a political structure analysis, while also capturing the states’
independence obtained after the welfare reform (1996 onwards). State governments are
18Nebraska has a nonpartisan and unicameral state government. Hence, it is assumed to be unified
throughout the entire sample period. I check the robustness of the results by dropping it from the estimation
of the models. The results do not change significantly.
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classified as divided almost 60 percent of the time. However, of the 555 times in which
state governments were divided, the Democratic party controlled two of the three bodies of
government 460 times (82.8 percent). The Republican party held control of the government
49.1 percent of the time in which states were governed by a single unified party majority.
These percentages are more balanced, although still tilted toward the democrat side, when
I relax the governor’s restriction and look at the political structure of the legislative branch
only. For both cases -unified or divided legislature- Republicans held majority nearly 41
percent of the times, while Democrats did it almost 59 percent of the time.
Looking at simple majorities, in which a party holds majority control of any two of
the three bodies examined, Democrats appear to have had control over 56.2 percent of the
times whereas Republicans had it 43.8 percent of the times. When splitting the sample by
looking at pre-and-post reform, the percentages look similar to those on Table (4.1). During
both periods state governments were unified 41.0 to 43.0 percent of the times. However,
some differences are noteworthy. The post-reform period (1997-2006) experienced a surge of
Republican representation.19 Governments with two out of the three bodies with Republican
majority grew from 33.1 percent during the first period to 50.4 percent after the reform
was implemented. In terms of unified versus divided governments, this is important since
unified governments with Republican control went from 31.1 percent to 63.7 percent after
1996. Divided governments had the same distribution observed in Table (4.1) during the two
periods. Alternatively, divided legislatures also experienced a decline in Democrat control
(64.6 percent to 45.4 percent) and a rise of Republican representation (35.4 percent to 54.6
percent).
If leaders associated with the Democrat party cater to the type of voter that receives
public welfare, as it is often believed, I suspect that regimes in which there is strong presence
of this party would exhibit higher degree of spatial responsiveness since these are votes they
19The year in which the reform was implemented has been left out of the two-period analysis. This is due
to the fact that not all states implemented the changes at the same time. Some started earlier than others,
going through a transition process. Hence, in an attempt to fully capture the full effect of the bill, I start
the post-reform period with the year 1997.
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would like to either preserve or attract.
4 Analysis and Results
4.1 One vs. Two Regimes
Table 4.2 shows results obtained for both ordinary least squares (OLS) and spatial regression
estimation using the whole sample period.20 The table shows the spatial dependence coef-
ficient and the marginal-effect estimates of state public welfare expenditures when political
structure of state governments is not taken into consideration. I find that the degree of
spatial dependence (ρ) among states is much smaller than those found by Baicker (2005b)
and Case, Rosen and Hines Jr. (1993) in previous studies of the United States. Although
the results show some level of political yardstick competition, the coefficient reflecting the
reaction to neighbors’ spending is very small and not statistically significant.21 The results
in Table 4.2 also show that once we account for spatial spillovers, the most important de-
terminants of state spending on public welfare are the amount of federal government grants,
the number of women with the highest probability to have children, and the unemployment
rate from the previous period. The table also shows that the effect of having a Democrat
governor becomes positive and statistically irrelevant, suggesting a potential bias in the OLS
estimates due to the presence of spatial interrelatedness in political variables. If taxes and
migration are associated, it is possible that increases in neighbors’ tax revenues may influence
own tax revenues, therefore a decline in transfer payments.
20Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests reveal robust presence of spatial dependency (15.987 and p-value<0.001).
21Previous studies for the United States have used levels of real per capita spending rather than the logs.
Accordingly, they have used a dollar-for-dollar interpretation of the spatial autocorrelation coefficient. I
refrain from such interpretation for two reasons. First, according to LeSage and Pace (2009), maximum
likelihood estimation requires that Z = (IN −ρW ) is non-singular so that its determinant is non-zero. Given
that W is symmetric and row-normalized, the compact open interval for ρ ∈ (λ−1min, λ−1max) will lead to a
symmetric positive definite Z. When these symmetric matrices are similar to row-stochastic (e.i. λmax = 1)
the upper bound for ρ becomes 1. Second, I use a log-transformation of real per capita expenditure which
would translate into elasticities in a least square estimation. Still, when using expenditure levels in maximum
likelihood, a dollar-for-dollar interpretation would imply that a $1 increase in neighbors’ spending cannot
affect own spending by more than $1, when it could feasibly occur.
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Table 4.2: OLS and One-regime Results for Public Welfare spending in the United
States (1987-2006)
OLS Spatial Durbin Model
Resultsa with Spatial and Time Fixed Effectsb
Variable Direct Indirect Total
PC Federal Grant 0.791*** 0.751*** 0.051 0.802***
(32.612) (17.557) (0.629) (8.613)
PC Tax Revenue 0.187*** 0.045 -0.521*** -0.476***
(4.478) (0.808) (-5.813) (-4.598)
PC Income (NOT)c 0.026 0.196 0.432 0.629**
(0.424) (1.185) (1.539) (2.244)
Population Density 0.000*** -0.000** 0.005*** 0.005***
(3.391) (-2.084) (7.203) (6.790)
Percent Female (20-64 y/o) 0.097*** 0.066*** 0.009*** 0.164***
(10.297) (4.296) (3.551) (5.773)
Percent Black -0.002** -0.002 -0.003 -0.005*
(-2.532) (-1.552) (-1.380) (-1.914)
Percent Elderly 0.016*** 0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(6.689) (0.492) (-0.330) (-0.116)
Lagged Unemployment Rate -0.009* 0.013** 0.002 0.015**
(-1.742) (2.275) (0.243) (2.246)
Democrat Governor -0.039*** 0.009 0.009 0.019
(-2.589) (1.132) (0.565) (1.021)
Adjusted R2 0.683 Log Likelihood 829.334
ρ 0.049
(1.104)
No. of Observations 960 960
No. of Years 20 20
a t-values are in parenthesis
b Statistical significance: ***1%, **5%, and *10%. For the effects estimates these are calculated from the
simulated values obtained using the information matrix
c NOT: Net of Transfers. All PC (per capita) values are real values in 2006 chained dollars.
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The signs on the marginal effects of the other covariates show no particular surprises.
States with higher taxes per capita and higher percentages of individuals over 65 years of age
tend to spend more on public assistance. These direct effects, however, are very small and
not statistically significant. Contrary to previous findings for other expenditures (e.g. total
expenditures, highway and education expenditures, etc.), I do not find significant evidence
of a correlation between public assistance expenditures and income per capita (see Baicker
(2005b); Case, Rosen and Hines Jr. (1993)). Yet the direct effect is positive which would
suggest that public welfare assistance in the United States, like in France (Elhorst and Fréret,
2009), may be becoming a normal good. Another plausible explanation is that higher per-
capita income allows states to increase their tax base, which can translate into higher public
welfare expenditures, consistent with the positive sign of the direct effect of tax revenues.
The effect estimates for the two-regime model are similar to those found under the one-
regime specification model with one notable exception. The percent of black becomes sta-
tistically significant. While small, the negative coefficient is not consistent with previous
results or popular beliefs. I also find that the political composition of the state government
does affect the degree of spatial dependence among neighboring states. Results for the two-
regime model of state welfare spending are in Table 4.3. These data show evidence that
divided governments engage in political yardstick competition while unified governments do
not. Contrary to the case of unified state governments, the degree of spatial autocorrelation
between states with divided governments and their neighbors is positive and statistically
significant. These results may seem puzzling if we believe that divided governments often
lead to political gridlock and legislation delays. If voters do judge the actions of their po-
litical leaders by comparing them to policy outcomes observed from neighboring states, and
elected politicians respond by engaging in competition, it should be relatively easier for uni-
fied governments, not divided, to engage in competition. Hence, it may be possible that
other factors outweigh the potential for gridlock.
Fiscal accountability is more stringent on unified governments than divided governments.
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Table 4.3: Two-regime model of Public Welfare spending in the
United States (1987-2006): Unified Vs. Divided Government
Spatial Durbin Model with Spatial with 2-way FEa
Variable Directb Indirect Total
PC Federal Grant 0.738*** 0.012 0.750***
(17.714) (0.150) (8.174)
PC Tax Revenue 0.047 -0.504*** -0.457***
(0.844) (-5.727) (-4.605)
PC Income (NOT)c 0.194 0.446 0.640**
(1.202) (1.625) (2.343)
Population Density -0.001* 0.006*** 0.005***
(-1.859) (7.794) (7.384)
Percent Female (20-64 y/o) 0.069*** 0.086*** 0.156***
(4.477) (3.321) (6.108)
Percent Black -0.009*** -0.005 -0.015***
(-3.339) (-1.111) (-2.798)
Percent Elderly 0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.711) (-0.336) (-0.037)
Lagged Unemployment Rate 0.014** 0.000 0.014**
(2.418) (0.011) (2.059)
Democrat Governor 0.009 0.008 0.018
(1.200) (0.527) (1.036)
Log-Likelihood 832.693
Unified Government (ρ1) -0.065
(-0.873)
Divided Government (ρ2) 0.118**
(1.996)
a t-values are in parenthesis
b Statistical significance: ***1%, **5%, and *10%. For the effects estimates
these are calculated from the simulated values obtained using the informa-
tion matrix
c NOT: Net of Transfers. All PC (per capita) values are real values in 2006
chained dollars.
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In other words, potential fiscal disasters are attributable to only one party when there is a
unified government. Governments under a unified structure may act more fiscally respon-
sible, which may lead them to ignore neighboring actions and focus inward. In divided
governments, when there is more than one party to blame for fiscal mismanagement, po-
litical leaders may easily deflect responsibility to the other party. Furthermore, politicians
in divided governments can have a greater incentive to engage in pork barrel and logrolling
activities, as these activities are used to persuade those with different priorities to vote on
a favored piece of legislature.22 If true, then the notion of gridlock may not occur to a large
extent under divided governments, freeing them to engage in yardstick competition. This
effect may be added to the fact that politicians are usually influenced by interest groups
that may shape the way they conduct fiscal policy. A final, and plausible, explanation can
be attributed to what ?? call the ‘Curly Effect,’ referring to the strategies of James Curley,
a mayor of Boston, to stay in office several periods by driving out certain type of voters.
On the other hand, in the cases where incumbency matters for reelection, unified gov-
ernments may behave in a monopolistic way and not worry about competition. Divided
governments are more representative of a diverse constituency, leading them to care more
about the next election and the complacency of their swinging voters. If voters then do
judge their politicians based on what their counterparts in neighboring states do, divided
governments are more likely to respond with similar policies and engage in some kind of
yardstick competition.
4.2 Alternative Estimations and the Welfare Reform of 1996
The results described above indicate that the structural composition of the state government
matters when measuring the spatial spillover effects of public welfare spending. However,
political yardstick competition may depend on factors other than the political organization
of the state’s government. Case, Rosen and Hines Jr. (1993) and Baicker (2005b) suggest
22See Tullock (1981);Shepsle and Weingast (1981); and Shepsle and Weingast (1994) for a review on
logrolling and pure majority rule.
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that different types of expenditure may exhibit different levels of spatial dependency, or even
the opposite sign. Additionally, if fiscal activity is primarily determined by the legislature,
the degree of political competition may be affected by the partisan majority of the legislative
branch instead of the whole government. Also, depending on the type of expenditure, it is
possible that the nature of the political party (left or right) that holds majority may impact
the extent to which states react to their neighbors’ fiscal decisions.23
To explore these alternatives, I estimate the two-regime model using two other regime
indices. I elaborate on the findings for unified versus divided governments by looking at the
composition and strength of the legislative branch. If ultimate approval of welfare spending
policies is largely determined by the state legislature, it is reasonable to isolate the effect of
partisan majorities in the legislature on welfare spending. If one party holds the majority of
seats in both houses, the state legislature is assumed to be unified and the diagonal element
of Dt that corresponds to that state takes the value of 1. Consequently, the state legislature
is assumed to be divided if each house is “controlled” by a different political party. This
second specification helps us to understand the restrictive power of state governors. If the
spatial autocorrelation under divided legislature is larger than under divided government, it
is possible to infer that governors play an important role in each state’s spending decision,
affecting the degree of fiscal reaction. Second, based on the belief that left-wing parties
may care more about the type of voter that receives welfare benefits, I test the degree of
spatial dependence by comparing Democrat versus Republican majority only. In this case,
either party is assumed to hold majority if it controls at least two of the three bodies of
government mentioned before. Therefore, a state government is considered Republican if
(1) it has a Republican governor and holds majority of one of the two houses, (2) it holds
majority in the two houses of congress but not the governorship, and (3) if it controls all
three.24
23Left-wing parties may be more reactive to fiscal policies that affect their particular constituency directly
(e.g. welfare assistance and higher redistribution), while right-wing parties may be more concerned with tax
policies in neighboring states.
24Nebraska is assumed to be ruled by the governor’s party.
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Additionally, the welfare reform of 1996 implemented significant changes to the way
in which states distributed their benefits. As consequence, I test whether the reform also
changed the way politicians respond to fiscal decisions made in neighboring states. I do this
by splitting the sample and looking at the spatial correlation coefficients for the pre and post
reform periods. Given that the transition to the new system did not occur simultaneously
in every state, I drop the year 1996 in order to capture the full implementation of the bill.
Consequently, the pre-reform period in my sample goes from 1987 through 1995, and the
post-reform one from 1997 through 2006.
Table 4.4 summarizes the results for the two-regime spatial coefficients for all four al-
ternative specifications of political structures analyzed. Although greater, the coefficient
of divided legislature is not statistically significant for the whole sample period, partially
highlighting the importance of the governor’s influence in the degree of spatial dependence
or competition. Indeed, the results show that, when looking at the whole sample period,
Democrat governors do exhibit positive and significant degrees of spatial dependence in pub-
lic welfare spending. This is also true when analyzing party majority only. Republicans, on
the other hand, do not appear to respond to neighboring welfare expenditure policies.
The welfare reform of 1996, however, does appear to have changed the way in which
politicians respond to neighboring welfare policies. The effect of both divided government
and divided legislatures loses statistical significance after the bill was implemented. Contrary
to what one would expect, the decentralization of the welfare system decreased the level
of competition among states. A plausible explanation is that even under the pressure of
reelection, policy makers in divided governments are now required to use more of their
own resources to fund this type of expenditure. Prior to 1996, the AFDC program was
an entitlement program in which state governments received all or most funds from the
federal government. Public welfare then was a grant-matching system in which the federal
government would contribute through grants, although it would not fund the totality of the
program. The reform bill mandated that states should be more responsible for the funding,
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changing from a matching to a blocking grant system. This may have influenced the way in
which policy makers make use of their own resources. Additionally, these results may suggest
that great part of the spatial dependence observed prior to the reform could be explained by
states competing to capture rents from the federal government, rather than providing the
goods demanded by their constituents.
Table 4.4: Public Welfare Spending Competition among U.S. States: Be-
fore and After Welfare Reform
Spatial Durbin Model 2-way FEa




Unified (ρ1) -0.0648 -0.1502 0.0558
(-0.873) (-1.358) (0.528)
Divided (ρ2) 0.1185** 0.1839** 0.0981
(1.996) (2.117) (1.135)
Legislature Compositionc
Unified (ρ1) 0.0263 0.0189 0.0222
(0.500) (0.245) (0.291)
Divided (ρ2) 0.1282 0.2338*** 0.2363
(1.375) (1.894) (1.600)
Party Majorityd
Democrat(ρ1) 0.1052** 0.0843 0.1472
(1.779) (1.069) (1.544)
Republican (ρ2) -0.0350 0.0495 -0.0061
(-0.483) (0.425) (-0.062)
Governor’s Partye
Democrat (ρ1) 0.1334** 0.0094 0.2714**
(1.962) (0.100) (2.509)
Republican (ρ2) 0.0046 0.1189 -0.0257
(0.075) (1.264) (-0.295)
a t-values are in parenthesis. Statistical significance: ***1%, **5%, and *10%.
b Considers party majority in all upper house, lower house, and governorship of each state
government.
c Only considers the party majority in the two legislative houses.
d A party holds majority if it controls two of the three bodies considered in the first specification.
e Only looks at the power of the governor and its party of affiliation.
Alternatively, table (4.1) showed that after 1996 there has been a surge of Republican
representation in both unified and divided governments. Indeed, if Republican politicians
care less about votes of welfare recipients, it is reasonable that post-reform political regimes
exhibit less significant degrees of welfare spending spatial dependence. Referring back to
the exit argument, Republican policy makers may actually benefit in the next election if,
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due to the lack of responsiveness, welfare-recipient voters that are more likely to vote for
Democrats leave the state (see Peltzman (1984, 1985) for voting preferences of welfare recip-
ients). Democrat governors, on the other hand, do exhibit positive and significant degrees
of state competition during the period after the bill was implemented. State governments
in which Democrats control at least two of the three government bodies are more influenced
by neighbors’ spending on welfare assistance.25
It is reasonable to believe that when politicians are being judged according to what is
observed in neighboring states, Democratic leaders may feel stronger pressure from low-
income voters who are more likely to vote Democrat. For instance, if one state raises its
maximum benefit level, surrounding states may lose residents as welfare recipients consider
migrating into that state. To compete for these citizens, neighboring states may raise benefits
as well (see Rom, Peterson and Scheve Jr. (1998)). The results then support the idea of this
being true for Democratic controlled states but not Republican ones. As mentioned above,
the Democrat party would be more likely to compete to keep low-income votes. Republicans,
on the other hand, may actually gain vote share by not competing with neighboring states
and allowing these Democratic voters to move out of state. Thus, a non-response might
be optimal for Republicans who may be indifferent to voting decisions of public welfare
recipients. This result may not hold true for other kinds of government spending. Following
Baicker (2005b) and Case, Rosen and Hines Jr. (1993), I also estimated the degree of spatial
dependence under the two-regime model using weight matrices with in-and-out migration
flows obtained from the PUMS CPS data. The results for this sample period using such
matrix are mixed and inconclusive. I believe that the interpretation of those results requires
further investigation on the degree of mobility among welfare recipients.26
Finally, I use an omitted-variable approach to look at the robustness of the results when
one or more control variables are dropped. None of the spatial coefficients vary significantly
25These results are almost significant at the 10 percent level.
26see Baicker (2005b) on how to construct more appropriate weight matrices capturing migration flows
within a model of fiscal competition.
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under different model specifications.27 The biggest change caused by the omission of one
single variable is given by the exclusion of the state’s share of women from the full model
specification. There is an increase in the level of spatial dependence when the control for the
population share of women is omitted, reflecting an upward bias in the coefficient. In other
words, when the percent of women is kept constant for all states the influence of neighboring
states’ spending on own spending decreases. This change is consistent across all categories
of political composition as well as all three sample periods.
The spatial correlation coefficient is also affected greatly by the inclusion or exclusion
of the unemployment rate in the model. Furthermore, the degree of neighboring influence
experiences its largest increase when both unemployment and percent female are omitted
from the full specification. Thus, we observe lower degrees of political yardstick competition
under divided governments when both unemployment and percent of females are held con-
stant across all sample units. This reflects some of the importance of both unemployment
benefits and temporary aid for needy families -mostly claimed by single mothers. On the
other hand, controlling for the percentage of the population older than 64 years of age does
not change the degree of spatial dependence. In other words, although Medicare is one of the
largest components of welfare spending and very important to many politicians, the variation
of the percentage of Medicare recipients does not provide any observable bias to the degree
of political competition. Further investigation and detailed information on specific welfare
benefits seem plausible for future research topics.
5 Summary and Conclusions
The degree of government competition in the United States depends on the political struc-
ture of the state governments. Using data on state and local public welfare expenditures, I
find evidence that unified governments are less likely to be influenced by neighboring gov-
ernments’ spending. Divided governments, on the other hand, do tend to mimic neighboring
27Results are available from the author upon request.
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spending decisions. Intuitively, potential for pork barrel and logrolling activities in divided
governments may possibly influence the levels of government spending, allowing some politi-
cians to be able to react to their neighbors’ spending decision. Moreover, it could be argued
that in the absence of complete party accountability, politicians have an incentive to aban-
don fiscal responsibility, as there is another party to blame. Divided governments may also
be subject to a more indecisive group of voters. Hence, politicians may be willing to respond
to policies in neighboring states in order to keep their position. I find here that the degree
of political yardstick competition for both divided and unified governments appears to be
influenced by the inclusion of the state governor as part of the fiscal decision making process.
Furthermore, the results suggest that political parties also influence the level of inter-
state competition. In the case of public welfare assistance, governments with a Democratic
majority exhibit positive and significant spatial dependence with neighbor states’ welfare
expenditures. One explanation is that given the average political inclinations of low-income
welfare recipients, Democrats feel more pressured to keep up with their neighbors’ welfare
spending decisions. Thus, if divided governments are heavily populated by Democratic politi-
cians it is reasonable to observe high degrees of expenditure spatial spillovers. This results
are not always the same. The implementation of the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996 became a switching point in the way
politicians behaved with respect to the welfare spending decisions adopted in neighboring
states. An increase in the percent of Republican representatives in state governments around
the United States and the fact that states became responsible for part of the funding for
welfare expenditures has decreased the level of spatial competition in welfare spending.
Overall, the results support both “exit” and “voice” arguments for political yardstick
competition mentioned in the introduction. The pre-reform time period exhibits a greater
degree of state interaction with respect to welfare spending in the absence of a government
coalition. This result supports the idea that politicians who are concerned about the next
election respond to what other states since they may be judged by what constituents observe
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elsewhere, the so-called “voice” argument. On the other hand, the results for the post-reform
period provide stronger support for the “exit” argument. If politicians are worried about
fleeing constituents, and welfare-recipient voters are more likely to support the Democrats,
it is reasonable to observe a higher degree of spatial interaction when states have strong
representation from the Democrat party, which is the case for that period.
I also calculate the total, direct, and indirect marginal effects being used in some of the
new cross-sectional studies with spatial analysis. I find that after controlling for spatial
autocorrelation, space and time fixed effects, and the political structure of the state gov-
ernment, grants from the federal government are the main direct determinants of a state’s
welfare spending. Tax revenues, on the other hand, affect welfare spending mostly through
neighbors. Interestingly, welfare may have become a normal good in the United States. This
is similar to the results found by Elhorst and Fréret (2009) for the case of France. This
is surprising, given some of the known differences between household preferences for public
good provision in the United States and France.
These results suggest that government conditions play an important role when studying
interstate government competition. The extent to which political regimes affect other aspects
of political yardstick competition is an important topic for future investigation. Although this
analysis is limited to studying states’ welfare assistance, this methodology may be applied
to other types of government spending, tax competition among states and/or counties, as




This dissertation addresses the efficacy of government expenditures on higher education and
public welfare. In 2006, U.S. state governments allocated nearly 44% of their budgets to-
ward these two areas, making them the largest and most important components of the state
expenditures. Both economists and policymakers are often concerned with the efficiency and
fairness of such allocation. This has generated controversial debates since some times effi-
ciency is sacrificed in the name of equity and vice versa. As these expenditures continuously
appear in each year’s states’ budgets without evidence of being reduced, this dissertation
takes a step back to look at whether these programs are justified on the grounds of achieving
their intended outcomes while examining some of their most visible consequences.
In Chapter 2 I examine how merit-based tuition assistance contributes to the retention
of graduates in a state. I analyze a restricted-use administrative data set that allows me
to determine the impact of merit-based aid in West Virginia (known as the PROMISE
Scholarship) on work participation in the state. The results suggest that, after controlling
for other factors such as age, sex, degree, and area of concentration, PROMISE graduates
to date are not more likely to work in the West Virginia after graduation. After attempting
to correct for the selection bias as much as possible, I find that these scholarship recipients
are between 1.9 and 5.0 percentage points less likely to work at establishments in the state
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than graduates that did not receive the scholarship.
These results reflect the fact that policymakers may induce high-school graduates to
remain in the state for college by reducing their tuition costs, but may not retain them
as in-state workers given the lack of incentives. Once these graduates have graduated from
college, there is no additional incentives that would persuade them to remain in the state. In
fact, policymakers should be wary that through this merit-based program they are selecting
a group of individuals that is already more mobile given that their aptitudes provide them
with a wide variety of work opportunities nationwide.
In chapter 3 I find that, in most states, women that participate in more than one program
will be subject to potentially high marginal tax rates creating a disincentive to pursue eco-
nomic independence. Statistically, I find that states with higher implicit marginal tax rates
tend to experience lower work participation rates of households that receive cash benefits
from the TANF (Temporary Aid For Needy Families) program.
It is important to note, however, that the Welfare Reform of 1996 has imposed time
limits of no more than 60 months of welfare collection over a person’s lifetime. This implies
that any estimation of the probability of work participation of welfare recipients requires
a longitudinal analysis, as people may move in and out of welfare based on the time limit
and the tax rates mentioned above. Yet, the results suggest that despite the huge efforts
to reform the welfare system in the United States, the adopted reforms have done little to
address the problem of providing low-income individuals with the economic incentives to
become self-sufficient, rather than simply mandating it through rules.
In chapter 4 I studied some of the consequences associated with the Welfare Reform.
Using state spending data from 1987 to 2006, I find that while there exists some degree
of spatial interaction among state governments (found in previous studies), the political
organization of a state affects the degree of such spatial dependence with regards to fiscal
policies. In particular, I find evidence that single party majority governments do not react
to neighboring states’ welfare spending while divided governments do. Furthermore, on
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average, fiscal policy reactions among states appear to depend on what political party holds
the majority of the government. Results, however, differ when the sample is partitioned into
the pre-and-post reform period. Despite the reform’s induced decentralization of the welfare
system, the post-reform sample shows lower degrees of fiscal interaction (or competition).
These findings highlight the importance of looking at the effects and consequences of some
of the government spending policies, before we even get to the efficiency and equity issues.
Policymakers need to understand whether or not their policies and expenditures actually
achieve the intended outcomes. In cases in which the outcomes as expected, policymakers
should also be aware of the consequences they may inflict upon others.
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According to the data generating process described in the methodology section, after re-
defining the space and time fixed effects, the marginal effects for the one-regime model can
be derived starting from the following reduced form




(IN − ρW ) 0N . . . 0N









In order to facilitate the understanding of the marginal-effect estimates, I use (A.1) and




Sr(W )Xr + P
−1[U + Γ + ε] (A.3)
Sr(W ) = P
−1(INTβr +WT θr) (A.4)
where Xr represents the r
th column of the NT × R matrix of control variables. Note that
P−1 is a block matrix of N ×N matrices with inverses of (IN − ρW ) in the diagonals. This
allows for the calculation of the marginal effects in any time period t, as shown by equation
(A.5). Assuming that W , βr, ρ, and θr are constant over time, the marginal effects of Xr on
Y are identical for all t. Note that this yields an N×N matrix with changes in each region’s




= Str(W ) = (IN − ρW )−1(INβr +Wθr), t = 1, ..., T (A.5)
In other words, Sr(W ) is also a block matrix of N × N matrices with partial derivatives
for each time period in the diagonal and zeros everywhere else. These diagonals are the
partial derivatives described in (A.5), which contain the changes caused by changes from the
explanatory variable Xr in every region at time t. Hence, S
t
r(W ) is an N ×N matrix with
partial derivatives obtained from changing the rth explanatory variable in each of the regions


























where the change in the dependent variable of region i given a change in variable Xr in region
i at time t is given by Str(W )ii ≡
∂yit
∂xrit
. The set of these “own-partial” derivatives are then
aggregated to provide a comprehensive measure of what has been defined by the literature
as the ‘direct’ effect. Similarly, Str(W )ij ≡
∂yit
∂xrjt
, and they are also aggregated to calculate
comprehensive measures of ‘indirect’ effects. Assuming that the parameter estimates do not
change over time, these effects estimates should stay constant for all time periods as well.
Two-Regime Model
For the case of the two regime model, the analysis is very similar. However, as each regime
varies with respect to time, that affects the composition of the P matrix, as well as the
calculation of the marginal effects. Using the same procedure, the DGP for the two-regime
model can be re-written as
Y = P−1[Xβ +WTXθ + U + Γ + ε] (A.7)
P =

(IN − ρ1W 11 − ρ2W 12 ) 0N . . . 0N





0N 0N . . . (IN − ρ1W T1 − ρ2W T2 )

(A.8)
where W t1 and W
t
2 are defined by the two regimes examined. The inverse of each of the
elements of P can be expanded in the same fashion such that the marginal effects include
the higher order effects, returning all the cumulative effects. Given that the two regimes
are mutually exclusive, we can assume that the two W matrices are additive such that
(IN − ρ1W t1 − ρ2W t2) = (IN − [ρ1W t1 + ρ2W t2]). Furthermore, let [ρ1W t1 + ρ2W t2] = A such
that (IN − ρ1W t1 − ρ2W t2)−1 = (IN − A)−1. Expanding this matrix we obtain (IN − A)−1 =
(IN +A+A





= Str(W ), t = 1, ..., T (A.9)
Str(W ) = (IN − A)−1(INβr +Wθr) (A.10)
where all higher order effects and interaction effects are accounted for. Note that the spatial
organization of each cross-section (W ) is still constant through time. Given the results from
(A.8) and (A.10), I define Sr(W ) as the block matrix that contains N×N matrices of partial
derivatives in the diagonal. Just as before, these diagonals contain the partial derivatives
of the dependent variable (welfare spending) in each region with respect to changes in the
Xr variable in each region. As mentioned before, I use maximum likelihood estimation to
find the parameter estimates, and use these estimates to calculate effect estimates (direct,
indirect, total) for each point in time the same way I did for the one-regime case.
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